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This Article analyzes the meaning of probability statements in tax law and 
in scholarship addressing civil tax penalties.  Specifically, the Article draws on 
economics and the philosophy of mathematics to argue that because tax law is 
substantively uncertain, some probability statements in tax law are best under-
stood as a reflection of the speaker’s belief, rather than as a description of the 
number of times a given event will occur out of the number of times that it 
could occur over the long run.  That is, these tax probability statements are best 
understood using a subjectivist interpretation of probability, rather than a fre-
quentist interpretation.  Prior work in tax law scholarship in particular, and 
law and economics in general, has either glossed over or misunderstood this 
crucial distinction.
Understanding that probability statements in tax law should be given a 
subjectivist interpretation changes both the theory and practice of tax compli-
ance.  First, because tax probabilities represent beliefs, different parties—for ex-
ample, Congress (the penalty setter) on the one hand and taxpayers on the 
other—may have different perceptions of the chances that a given transaction is 
permissible, and economic models should reflect these possibly disparate beliefs.  
Second, a subjectivist interpretation of tax probabilities provides additional 
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support for stringent and widely criticized laws that regulate the substance of 
tax advisors’ written opinions, as these strict rules may actually help tax advi-
sors arrive at more accurate, less biased estimates of the chance that a tax posi-
tion would be upheld by a court.  And finally, lawmakers should be cautious of 
reducing tax law’s uncertainty.  If, as empirical work suggests, some taxpayers 
have an aversion to uncertainty, the uncertainty associated with whether cer-
tain questionable transactions are permitted (aside from any penalties imposed 
if transactions do turn out to be forbidden) may itself reduce the number of tax-
payers who engage in those transactions. 
The theorist not having definite assumptions clearly in mind in working out the 
“principles,” it is but natural that he, and still more the practical workers build-
ing upon his foundations, should forget that unreal assumptions were made, and 
should take the principles over bodily, apply them to concrete cases, and draw 
sweeping and wholly unwarranted conclusions from them. . . . [I]t is imperative 
that the contrast between these simplified assumptions and the complex facts of 
life be made as conspicuous and as familiar [in economics] as has been done in 
mechanics. 
Frank H. Knight
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INTRODUCTION
Economic approaches to analyzing legal problems can provide 
helpful insights by applying a set of familiar analytical approaches to 
reach conclusions that would otherwise be nonobvious.  However, if 
economic models are used to support specific policy recommenda-
tions, the assumptions and definitions underlying these models must 
be made explicit and evaluated, particularly because those models 
have become so familiar and are too often applied without sufficient 
reappraisal of their underlying assumptions, strengths, and weak-
nesses.  Rooting out and understanding the components of economic 
models is particularly important in tax law, where economic analysis 
has become a predominant method of analysis. 
One core claim of economic analysis is that individuals tend to act 
in their own self-interest:  individuals weigh the costs and benefits of a 
given action and act when the expected benefits of that action out-
weigh the expected costs.  A corollary of this insight, as famously 
stated by Gary Becker, is the idea that the optimal sanction to impose 
on lawbreakers depends on both the expected harm to society created 
by the unlawful act and the probability that the lawbreaker will be ap-
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prehended.2  This basic model has been analyzed and expanded in 
the tax context by a slew of economists and, more recently, legal 
scholars, both in more formal papers and as a basis for broad-stroke 
proposals.  Relying on the basic model, David Weisbach uses the idea 
of marginal deterrence to propose an optimal level of judicial anti-
avoidance doctrines such as the economic-substance and business-
purpose doctrines.3  Alex Raskolnikov, taking a more conceptual ap-
proach, argues that the economic calculus of deterrence suggests that 
penalties should be higher for tax evasion that is difficult to detect.4
There are any number of additional examples.5
Some scholars acknowledge that specific recommendations based 
on these models are only “second best” approaches.  Raskolnikov, for 
example, acknowledges that some underlying assumptions of eco-
nomic theory remain “controversial” and that his goal is not to create 
an ideal tax system, but merely to remove “obvious flaws.”6  In its 
strongest version, though, the claim is that economic models are the 
best method for creating tax law policy.  Thus, Weisbach writes that 
“[to] use an economics approach to answer a question normally ad-
dressed only by lawyers . . . is, in my view, the right way to approach 
tax law policy.”7  Given the centrality of economic analysis to tax 
scholarship and policy, it is crucial to understand the assumptions and 
definitions underlying that analysis.8
2 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:  An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169 (1968). 
3 David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax-Avoidance Doctrines, 4 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 88 (2002).  For further discussion of these doctrines, see infra Section II.A. 
4 Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation:  Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-
Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 599-605 (2006). 
5 See, e.g., Yoram Keinan, Playing the Audit Lottery:  The Role of Penalties in the U.S. 
Tax Law in the Aftermath of Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 3 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 381, 419-21 (2006) (using cost-benefit analysis to argue that tax-compliance 
legislation should focus on increasing the likelihood of detection rather than on in-
creasing penalties); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms:  The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 
VA. L. REV. 1781, 1782 (2000) (developing a “signaling model” for tax compliance in 
which individuals are said to comply with tax laws in order to signal that they have a 
low discount rate and are therefore unlikely to “cheat” in future transactions). 
6 Raskolnikov, supra note 4, at 579-80. 
7 David A. Weisbach, Disrupting the Market for Tax Planning, 26 VA. TAX REV. 971, 
972 (2007). 
8 The need to understand these assumptions is, of course, not unique to tax law.  
See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan, Playing with Fire:  Feminist Legal Theorists and the Tools of Eco-
nomics, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS 61, 74-79 (Martha Albertson 
Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005) (highlighting assumptions on which cer-
tain economic models rely and warning both that economic models include values 
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This Article analyzes one concept crucial to the economic ap-
proach as applied to tax law:  the meaning of probability statements in 
scholarship addressing civil tax penalties.  This definition is both 
theoretically and practically important.  From the theoretical side, one 
core assumption of a law and economics approach is the validity of 
expected-utility theory:  that an individual takes only those actions that 
she believes will increase her own welfare.9  Put another way, an indi-
vidual takes an action only when the benefits of that action outweigh 
the costs.  But the expected benefits and costs of an action depend on 
the relative probabilities of the various outcomes of that action.  Un-
derstanding the meaning of probability statements thus sheds light on 
the basic terms of the law and economics argument. 
Moreover, it is particularly important to understand the meaning of 
probability statements in tax law (as opposed to other areas that may be 
subject to economic analysis) because of tax law’s uniquely problematic 
types and degrees of uncertainty.  It is often unclear ex ante whether a 
position will (or should) be subject to a penalty ex post, and this un-
certainty, or chance of incorrectness, has been incorporated into the 
law itself.  Taxpayers who take positions that are less likely to be cor-
rect are subject to higher penalties, and tax advisors are often called 
upon to protect taxpayers from these penalties by providing opinion 
letters stating that the taxpayers’ positions have a certain probability 
of being correct.10  Thus, understanding the meaning of probability 
statements can help structure a more effective penalty system. 
within their frameworks and that the tools of economics are not, pace economics’ sci-
entific apparatus, a source of value-neutral answers); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis Without Analyzing Costs or Benefits:  Reasonable Accommodation, Balancing, and 
Stigmatic Harms, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1895, 1896 (2007) (pointing out, through an analy-
sis of a Seventh Circuit holding by Judge Posner that a particular accommodation is 
not “reasonable” under the Americans with Disabilities Act, that “cost-benefit analysis 
can . . . operate as a vessel for unreliable intuitions rather than a way of disciplining 
them”).
9 See, e.g., Becker, supra note 2, at 176. 
10 See infra subsection III.A.1. 
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With a few notable exceptions,11 however, legal scholarship has 
not focused on the question of what probability statements mean.  
This lacuna exists even though law and economics has become in-
creasingly important in the legal academy and even though the mean-
ings of probability statements and the implications of those various 
possible meanings have received sustained attention in the economics 
(as opposed to law and economics) literature.  Indeed, a discussion of 
the meaning of probability statements has been completely absent 
from the tax-compliance legal literature12—even those articles that 
take as their framework the Beckerian approach to compliance.  Many 
articles fail to provide any definition of probability, while other tax-
specific articles simply equate the probability of sanction with the frac-
tion of taxpayers who are audited.13  But defining the probability of 
11 There has been some discussion of the distinction between frequentism and 
subjectivism (Bayesianism) both in the context of risk assessment by regulators such as 
the Environmental Protection Agency, see, e.g., David E. Adelman, Scientific Activism and 
Restraint:  The Interplay of Statistics, Judgment, and Procedure in Environmental Law, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 497 (2004); Matthew D. Adler, Against “Individual Risk”:  A Sympa-
thetic Critique of Risk Assessment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1142, 1206-20 (2005); Matthew 
D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm:  The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, 87 MINN.
L. REV. 1293, 1297-98, 1340-88 (2003), and in the context of evidence law, in particular 
the use of scientific evidence in the courtroom, see, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Mapping Evi-
dence Law, 4 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1065, 1094, 1095 & n.52 (2003).  Additionally, the dis-
tinction between frequentist and subjectivist interpretations has been used to call into 
question the behavioral law and economics claim that people do not “correctly” or “ra-
tionally” incorporate information about probabilities into their decision making.  See, 
e.g., Charles Yablon, The Meaning of Probability Judgments:  An Essay on the Use and Misuse 
of Behavioral Economics, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 899. 
12 For example, Terrence R. Chorvat, Ambiguity and Income Taxation, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 617 (2002), discusses the effect of ambiguity on substantive tax policy, in particular 
the taxation of risk-taking, but he does not address the effect of ambiguity on tax compli-
ance.  Several legal scholars have applied behavioral law and economics (i.e., the idea 
that people “incorrectly” incorporate information about probabilities into their deci-
sion making) to tax law.  See, e.g., Christopher C. Fennell & Lee Anne Fennell, Fear and 
Greed in Tax Policy:  A Qualitative Research Agenda, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 75, 129-36 
(2003) (pointing out gaps in tax-aversion research and analysis); Lee Anne Fennell, 
Death, Taxes, and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REV. 567, 572-93 (2003) (using behavioral law 
and economics to explain puzzles related to the estate tax); Edward J. McCaffery & 
Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 106, 107-08 (2006) 
(reporting a set of experiments that suggest that “ordinary people think about tax” in-
consistently with “ideal rationality”).  But these articles address issues that arise subse-
quent to this Article’s topic—that is, what the putatively correct probability means. 
13 One notable exception to this general failure to define probability is Raskol-
nikov, who breaks down the probability of punishment into the probabilities 
that an offense will be detected; that it will be selected for prosecution; that 
the government will prevail at trial on the substantive issue, decide to seek a 
penalty and convince a court to impose it; that the judgments favoring the 
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sanction as the chance of audit, or even as the chance of detection, 
might be close to accurate if every tax-reporting position were either 
clearly wrong or clearly right.  In that case, either there would be no 
chance of a penalty’s being imposed due to the position, or the 
chance of a penalty would be primarily determined by the chance that 
the position would be detected.  But tax law is complicated enough 
that it is unclear whether some tax positions are in fact wrong.  In-
deed, many tax positions that are eventually struck down by courts 
adhere to the letter of the statute.14  In other words, because tax law is 
uncertain, to equate the probability of sanction with the chance of de-
tection is a vast oversimplification. 
This Article uses insights from economics and the philosophy of 
mathematics to argue that many statements about tax probabilities are 
best interpreted as statements about belief, not as statements about 
the number of times a particular event will happen in the long run.  
Interpreting tax statements as statements about belief changes a num-
ber of widely accepted conclusions in the tax literature.  As this Article 
shows, this interpretation adds a new complication to optimal tax 
modeling that may reverse other legal scholars’ results, supports re-
cent controversial laws relating to tax advisors that have changed tax 
law practice, and, counterintuitively, cautions against making tax law 
more certain. 
Part I frames the problem of interpreting probability statements.  
Section I.A explains why probability statements are key to a law and 
economics analysis of tax compliance, and Section I.B explains two 
ways to interpret statements about probability:  frequentist and subjec-
tivist.  A frequentist interpretation takes a statement about probability 
to describe the number of times a given event will occur over the long 
run out of the number of times that it could occur.  A subjectivist in-
terpretation takes a statement about probability to describe the 
speaker’s belief about whether the event will occur.  Part II addresses 
what it means for a tax position to have a certain chance of being cor-
government will survive appeals; and, finally, that the government will actually 
collect the penalty from a taxpayer. 
Raskolnikov, supra note 4, at 581.  Indeed, the probability that a penalty will be im-
posed can be decomposed into an arbitrarily large number of probabilities.  He fo-
cuses on the probability of detection, noting that audit is not sufficient to discover a 
“bad” transaction and that the probability of a penalty should be broken down into the 
probability of audit and the probability that the position is discovered if a return is au-
dited. Id. at 583. 
14 These transactions are held impermissible under the court-created doctrines 
discussed below.  See infra Section II.A. 
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rect.  A position is “correct” for penalty purposes if it would be upheld 
by a court.  This Part argues that statements about the likelihood that 
a particular tax position would be upheld by a court should be inter-
preted as statements about beliefs:  that is, that these statements 
should be given a subjectivist interpretation.  Part III lays out three 
possible implications of the subjectivist interpretation for tax-
compliance practice and theory.  Section III.A gives an example of 
how systematically disparate beliefs about the probability that a tax po-
sition is correct can lead to unexpected results in economic modeling.  
In particular, if lawmakers and taxpayers have different views of 
whether tax positions are correct, a welfarist approach may, contrary 
to arguments other academics have made, actually support fault-based 
penalties.  Section III.B describes how a subjectivist interpretation of 
tax probability statements provides another justification for regula-
tions that impose rigorous requirements on the substance of legal 
opinions provided by tax advisors.  Section III.C suggests that, given 
the subjectivist interpretation of tax probability statements, if taxpayers 
are averse to uncertainty, making tax law more predictable might actu-
ally decrease compliance. 
I. INTERPRETING PROBABILITY STATEMENTS
A.  The Economics of Deterrence:  Why Tax Probabilities Matter 
In the typical economic model of individual utility maximization, 
a person takes an action only if the benefit of that action outweighs 
the cost.  Thus, if society is to prevent an action, it must make the cost 
of that action greater than its benefit.  But this does not mean that 
the penalty for stealing $100 should be only $101, because someone 
who steals $100 may or may not be caught.  Rather, the expected cost 
of the action must outweigh the expected benefit.  In other words, at is-
sue is not the amount of the penalty assigned to the bad action, but 
rather the expected value of the penalty in the mind of the potential 
lawbreaker. 
The idea of expected utility or expected value is, of course, at the 
core of law and economics.  On this understanding, an individual 
considers the effect that an action will have on her welfare by analyz-
ing the expected utility of that action.  An action’s expected utility 
equals the sum of the utility of each possible outcome of the action, 
multiplied by the probability that that particular outcome will occur.  
2009] Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertainty 1025
For example, the expected value of a coin flip in which heads pays a 
dollar and tails pays nothing is, assuming a fair coin,15 fifty cents:  one 
dollar multiplied by 50% (the chance that the coin will come up 
heads), plus zero multiplied by 50% (the chance that the coin will 
come up tails).  Put another way, the expected value of a game is the 
answer to the question, “How much would you pay to play this game?”  
So the answer to the question, “How much would you pay to play a 
game in which a coin is flipped and you receive (a) one dollar if the 
coin comes up heads or (b) nothing if the coin comes up tails?” 
should be fifty cents.16
Similarly, the expected benefit of engaging in a particular tax ac-
tivity equals the utility of the amount of tax savings that the activity will 
create, multiplied by the probability that the taxpayer will be permit-
ted to engage in the activity.  The expected cost of engaging in that 
activity equals the (dis)utility of the penalty that will be imposed on 
the taxpayer if she is not permitted to engage in the activity, multi-
plied by the probability that the penalty will be imposed.  The ex-
pected utility of the activity is the sum of these two values. 
More formally, where 
I = income; 
U(*) = utility of consumption; 
T = tax due with compliance; 
t = tax due without compliance, t < T;
F = penalty for noncompliance, F  0; and 
p = probability of imposition of penalty, 
a taxpayer will weigh the relative utilities of two worlds:  first, the 
world in which she complies and gets the utility of her income less the 
tax she owes (i.e., the left side of Equation 1 below); and second, the 
world in which she does not comply (i.e., the right side of Equation 
1).  In the world in which she does not comply, one of two things will 
happen:  she will get caught, in which case she will have to pay the tax 
she would have owed plus some penalty, or she will not get caught, in 
which case she will pay a smaller amount than she would have had she 
complied.  If she is caught, she will be worse off than if she had com-
15 We assume, for example, that the coin is not weighted so that the chance of the 
coin turning up tails is 75%; in that case, the expected value of the coin toss would be 
only twenty-five cents. 
16 This answer assumes, of course, that the person has no particular taste for or 
against risk or coin-flipping games. 
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plied, but if she gets away with cheating, she will be better off.17  For-
mally, then, the taxpayer complies when the utility of the world in 
which she does not cheat exceeds the utility of the world in which she 
does cheat: 
U(I – T ) > p × U(I – T – F ) + (1 – p) × U(I – t) [1]. 
Most importantly for this Article, this analysis makes clear that to 
determine the expected benefit and expected cost of an activity, we 
must weight all possible outcomes by the probabilities of those out-
comes.  Therefore, to use this analysis to predict taxpayer behavior or 
recommend appropriate tax policy, we must understand the meaning 
of probability statements.  The next Section provides the framework 
for a more accurate characterization of the probability that a taxpayer 
will be subject to a sanction by describing two possible ways to inter-
pret tax probability statements. 
B.  What Statements About Probability Mean 
Some events involve risk; some involve uncertainty.  We are oper-
ating under risk if an event may or may not happen in the future and 
we know the chances that it will happen.18  For example, craps is a 
game of risk.  We do not know whether two dice will add up to seven 
on the next roll, but we know that the probability of this event (assum-
ing the dice are fair) is six out of thirty-six, or one out of six.19  An 
event is uncertain if it may or may not happen in the future and we do 
not know the chances that it will happen.  For example, I do not know 
whether a particular sports team will win its next game or whether a par-
ticular candidate will win the next presidential election.  But, unlike 
the situation with the dice, I also do not know the probability that the 
team, or the candidate, will win. 
Of course, few probabilities, if any, are known with certainty.  A 
coin flip or roll of the dice is probably the closest we can come in the 
real world to risk, as opposed to uncertainty, and a coin flip or roll of 
the dice is a question of risk only if we are certain that the coin or dice 
are fair.  For example, our opponent might be a cheat, and the dice 
might, unbeknownst to us, be weighted; indeed, even if we know that 
17 This assumes, of course, that for incomes x and y, if x > y, then U(x) > U(y).  In 
other words, it assumes that the utility function is strictly increasing. 
18 See generally KNIGHT, supra note 1, ch. 7. 
19 Saying that the probability is one out of six is the same as saying that the odds 
are five to one against. 
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the dice are weighted, if we do not know how they are weighted, we 
also do not know the probability that the dice will add up to seven.  
Thus, we assume that we know the probability of a situation only be-
cause “we have chosen to simplify our description . . . by treating [the 
situation] as [a] case[] of known probabilities.”20  Nonetheless, deci-
sions may be more or less risky (as opposed to uncertain), and so, us-
ing the “simplified” example of a fair roll of the dice, we can further 
examine the distinction between risk, on the one hand, and uncer-
tainty, on the other. 
1.  Risk and Frequentism 
What does it mean to say that we “know” that the probability of 
rolling a seven is one out of six?  One interpretation is that, in the 
long run, over many rolls, the percentage of sevens rolled will con-
verge on one out of six.  The rolls of the dice are random events that 
are independent from each other, and therefore the law of large 
numbers applies.  This sort of interpretation of a statement of prob-
ability (“The chance that we will roll a seven is one out of six”) is a 
frequentist interpretation.  In other words, a frequentist interpreta-
tion of the statement “The probability of the event is X%” is “Over the 
long run, the ratio of occurrences to total events will converge on 
X%.”  Equivalently, a frequentist interpretation of the probability of 
an event can be taken to mean that the underlying class from which 
the sample is drawn contains X% “event” and 1 – X% “nonevent.”  
This would be a way to understand the statement, made by someone 
who knows that a container contains one hundred balls, five of which 
are red, that “the probability that I will draw a red ball from the con-
tainer is 5%.” 
2.  Uncertainty and Subjectivism 
Not all events can be so interpreted, though.  Think again of the 
example of the sports team—for example, the New York Giants.  
Someone might say during football season, “The Giants have a 75% 
chance of winning their next game.”21  A frequentist interpretation 
does not illuminate this statement.  Does this person mean that, over 
20 Sven Ove Hansson, Philosophical Perspectives on Risk, 8 TECHNÉ 10, 11-12 (2004). 
21 Actually, she would probably say something like, “The odds are three to one 
that the Giants will win Sunday,” which is the same thing.  Or she might say, “The Gi-
ants money line is -300.” 
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the long run, the Giants will win 75% of their games—that their win-
ning percentage over time will converge on 75%?  That does not seem 
right.  Maybe next year the Giants will have a terrible team, and for 
the next twenty years after that they will win only one game a season.  
That possibility does not have anything to do with whether they win 
this game.  Or consider the statement, “Mitt Romney has a 10% 
chance of winning the 2012 presidential election.”  That statement 
cannot mean that, over time, Romney’s winning percentage in presi-
dential elections will converge on 10%. 
Perhaps, then, the person means that the Giants have won three 
out of four games “just like this one.”  What does it mean, though, for 
a game to be “just like this one”?  This question raises two related 
problems.  First, this is a nonrepeatable event:  the Giants playing next 
week’s opponents under these precise circumstances will happen only 
once.  Second, we have a reference-class problem:  What group of 
games should we look at to determine how many times the event “Gi-
ants win” occurs?  All the games the Giants have ever played?  Away 
games?  Games against this opponent?  Away games against this oppo-
nent?  Away games against this opponent when it is snowing?  As we 
make the description of the reference class more specific, we are in 
some ways gaining information; each of these factors may affect 
whether the Giants win.  On the other hand, we are also narrowing 
the class until we have no other games to which to compare this game, 
because this particular game is a nonrepeatable event. 
Similarly, if Romney runs in 2012, he will have run for President 
before, but never against those particular (future) opponents and 
never in that particular political climate.  And the reference-class 
problem presents itself here as well:  What group of elections should 
we look at to determine how many times “Romney wins” occurs?  All 
elections in which he has competed?  Only federal-level elections?  
Only presidential elections?  Only presidential elections when he runs 
against incumbents?  As before, making the reference class more spe-
cific provides us with more information, but again, the more informa-
tion we add, the narrower the class becomes—sometimes becoming 
empty, as in the last category. 
The statements “The Giants have a 75% chance of winning their 
next game” and “Romney has a 10% chance of winning the 2012 
presidential election” are not, however, meaningless.  Each statement 
tells us something about the belief of the person who makes the 
statement.  Specifically, we can take each statement to tell us how 
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strongly the person making it believes that the Giants (or Romney, as 
the case may be) will win. 
One way of capturing this belief is to ask how much the person 
would pay to have a chance to win one dollar if the Giants win their 
next game.  Under this interpretation, the statement, “The Giants 
have a 75% chance of winning” might be taken to mean that the per-
son making this statement would be willing to pay seventy-five cents to 
have a chance to win one dollar if the Giants win their game.22 Simi-
larly, “Romney has a 10% chance of winning” would mean that the 
person would be willing to pay ten cents to have a chance to win one 
dollar if Romney is elected president in 2012.  This interpretation of 
probability—that a statement about probability reflects the strength 
of the speaker’s belief that the event will happen—is a subjectivist 
interpretation. 
The betting analogy makes sense because the player should be 
willing to pay the expected value of the bet.  If she wins, she gets one 
dollar.  If she loses, she gets nothing.  So her expected value (EV) for 
this bet should be the probability of winning (P), multiplied by $1, 
plus the probability of losing, multiplied by zero: 
EV = P(1) + (1 – P)(0),
which simplifies to 
EV = P.
The betting analogy, however, only imperfectly captures the idea 
of degrees of belief.  For example, it assumes that the person who is 
making this bet is risk neutral (i.e., that she neither particularly likes 
nor particularly dislikes betting).  If she is not risk neutral, then her 
expected utility will be increased (or decreased) by the act of betting 
itself.  Similarly, the analogy assumes that the person has no other rea-
son for making the bet.  If the Giants’ coach were to bet on the game, 
he might have other reasons for setting the odds heavily in the Giants’ 
22 See, e.g., BRUNO DE FINETTI, 1 THEORY OF PROBABILITY 194-95 (Antonio Machi & 
Adrian Smith trans., John Wiley & Sons 1974) (1970) (explaining how to evaluate the 
meaning of probability statements in the forecasting of sports results); RICHARD JEF-
FREY, SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY 1-2 (2004) (providing an introduction to betting and 
probabilities); LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 30 n.† (1954) 
(discussing and providing examples of the “personal” view of probability, another term 
for which is “subjective probability”). 
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favor—perhaps to express his strong belief in his team.23  And were 
Romney himself to place a public bet on his election, he might bet on 
himself because he wants to win, and he might lose votes if he re-
vealed that he believed there to be little chance he would be elected.  
But for our purposes we may assume a risk-neutral, betting-neutral 
person with no expressive interest in the bet. 
The identity of the person making the prediction might affect 
how much weight we should give her statement in another way.  If we 
thought that the person knew a lot about football, we might give more 
weight to her statement.  If we thought that the person did not even 
know who the Giants were, or what sport they play, we might not give 
much weight to her opinion at all—we might think that she was just 
making up a number.  Finally, we might be particularly interested in 
someone’s view of the Giants’ chances if that person could affect the 
outcome of the game.  If the head referee, for example, told you that 
he was sure that the Giants would win the game, you might pay par-
ticular attention, because he could throw the game.  Similarly, we 
might find particularly interesting the views of Romney’s campaign 
manager (or anyone who would be in a position to sabotage Romney’s 
campaign) on whether Romney will be elected.  For our purposes, 
however, we will imagine the probability statement to be the statement 
of someone who cannot mold the outcome of the event. 
Defining statements of probability as statements about belief is 
most assuredly not a radical, deconstructive move that drains all 
meaning out of probability statements.  Perhaps the easiest way to see 
this is to contrast “subjectivist” or “subjective” as used here with “sub-
jective” as used in criminal or contract law.  The term “subjective” in 
criminal or contract law is often set in opposition to “objective” as a 
method of judging the rationality of an individual’s belief.  A subjec-
tive test looks only at the individual’s belief.  A subjective test would 
allow as a defense against willful evasion of tax an individual’s good-
faith, honest belief that the law does not require anyone to pay in-
come tax.  An objective test would not allow such a belief as a defense, 
because the belief that the law does not require anyone to pay tax is 
unreasonable.24
23 See, e.g., Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek, What Are Degrees of Belief?, 86 STUDIA 
LOGICA 183, 187 (2007) (“[T]hink of the football team owner who flamboyantly places 
a bet at ridiculously short odds on his team winning, as a display of his loyalty.”). 
24 See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202 (1991) (“[T]he issue is 
whether, based on all the evidence, the Government has proved that the defendant was 
aware of the duty at issue, which cannot be true if the jury credits a good-faith misunder-
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I use the word “subjectivist” here quite differently, following its 
use in the philosophy of probability.  A subjectivist interpretation of a 
probability statement is not set in contrast to some other method of 
judging a belief.  Rather, a subjectivist interpretation of a statement 
about probability says that the statement is about some particular in-
dividual’s internal state.  This is set in contrast to an interpretation 
that purports to say something about the external world, such as a 
frequentist interpretation, which is, at bottom, simply a matter of 
counting occurrences in the world.  Under a frequentist interpreta-
tion, to say that the chance of rolling a seven is one out of six is simply 
to say that this event will happen a certain number of times; that the 
number of times can be counted; and that if we rolled the dice many, 
many times and then counted the number of sevens rolled as against 
other numbers, one out of every six rolls would be a seven. 
Thus, it is quite possible to judge a probability statement even if 
we interpret that statement to reflect an individual’s belief.  An indi-
vidual’s belief can be more or less reasonable—it can comport with 
general beliefs and with facts in the world, or it can be a belief that no 
reasonable person holds.  Defining statements about probabilities as 
statements of belief does not, therefore, put those statements beyond 
judgment—indeed, as discussed below, tax penalties rely in part on 
judgments about the reasonableness of these beliefs.25
*      *      * 
Bearing in mind the distinction between risk and frequentism, on 
the one hand, and uncertainty and subjectivism, on the other, we can 
now understand tax-related statements about probability. 
II. AN UNCERTAIN CHANCE OF CORRECTNESS
This Part examines what it means to say that a tax position has a 
particular chance of being correct, and why that statement is a state-
ment under uncertainty and therefore should be interpreted as a 
statement about belief. 
standing and belief submission [i.e., a subjective standard], whether or not the claimed 
belief or misunderstanding is objectively reasonable [i.e., an objective standard].”). 
25 See infra text accompanying notes 97-100. 
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A.  Sources of Uncertainty in Tax Law:  Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines 
Complying with tax law is not easy.  A transaction may adhere to 
every element laid out in the tax code but still violate the law.  To be 
permissible, the transaction must also be consistent with “the thing 
which the statute intended.”26  This rule is why tax shelters are difficult 
to create:  anyone can think of a way to pay less tax,27 but a true tax 
shelter permits a taxpayer to pay less tax while still adhering to the let-
ter of the law.  And this is also why tax shelters are difficult to define:  
the essence of a tax shelter is that it technically complies with the law 
while nonetheless violating the substance or intent of the law, which is 
no easy thing to determine.28
Courts have developed a number of judicial doctrines to capture 
the animating spirit of the tax code, though there is not uniform 
agreement about how these doctrines interact or should be applied.  
The sham-transaction doctrine holds essentially that the substance, 
not the form, of a transaction determines whether it will be upheld for 
tax purposes.29  Relatedly, the economic-substance test asks whether 
the transaction has nontax economic benefits30 and rejects transac-
tions “that comply with the literal terms of the tax code but lack eco-
nomic reality.”31  Finally, the business-purpose test looks at the intent 
26 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).  The Court in Helvering struck 
down a transaction that adhered to the letter of the law because the transaction vio-
lated “the plain intent of the statute,” and thus to uphold the transaction would have 
been to “exalt artifice above reality.”  Id. at 470. 
27 See, e.g., Saturday Night Live:  Steve Martin’s Monologue (NBC television broadcast 
Jan. 21, 1978) (“You can be a millionaire and never pay taxes!  You can be a million-
aire and never pay taxes!  You say, ‘Steve, how can I be a millionaire and never pay 
taxes?’  First, get a million dollars.  Now, you say, ‘Steve, what do I say to the tax man 
when he comes to my door and says, “You have never paid taxes”?’  Two simple words.  
Two simple words in the English language:  ‘I forgot!’”). 
28 This “tension between technical compliance with the Internal Revenue Code” 
and judicial anti-abuse doctrines has been characterized as “[p]oignant[]” by the 
Court of Federal Claims.  Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11, 13 (2007). 
29 See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573, 583-84 (1978) (de-
scribing the analysis to use when determining whether a transaction is a sham for tax 
purposes); see also Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 440-42 (4th 
Cir. 2006) (same). 
30 See, e.g., ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 2214-17 (1997) (ex-
plaining that the economic-substance test requires a fact-based determination as to 
whether the transaction is “rationally related to a useful nontax purpose that is plausi-
ble in light of the taxpayer’s conduct and useful in light of the economic situation and 
intentions”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998). 
31 Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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or purpose of the taxpayer and asks whether the taxpayer intended to 
engage in a transaction that had nontax benefits.32
Some courts hold that the economic-substance test should take 
into account both the economic substance of a transaction and the 
business purpose behind the transaction33 and that a transaction can 
be struck down only if it fails both tests.34  Other courts have struck 
down a transaction after finding that the transaction has no economic 
reality other than to reduce taxes.  In other words, these courts hold 
that an economic analysis that revealed no benefit other than a tax 
benefit was sufficient for striking down a transaction and that there 
was no need to inquire into the taxpayer’s purpose for entering into 
the transaction.35  Yet other courts have described the relationship be-
tween the economic-substance and business-purpose steps as not “dis-
crete prongs” of a “rigid” analysis, but rather “related factors,” both of 
which should “inform [an] analysis of whether [a] transaction ha[s] suf-
ficient substance . . . to be respected for tax purposes.”36
More important for our purposes than the details of these doc-
trines, though, is that the doctrines are standards, not rules.37  That is, 
whether something is an acceptable tax position, on the one hand, or 
a tax shelter, on the other, is determined not before the transaction is 
entered into, but rather after it is reviewed; the law of tax shelters is 
32 See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885, 895 
(E.D. Tex. 2007) (describing the business-purpose test as a “subjective inquiry”). 
33 See, e.g., id.
34 See, e.g., Black & Decker, 436 F.3d at 441 (“To treat a transaction as a sham, the 
court must find [(1)] that the taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes . . . and 
[(2)] that the transaction has no economic substance . . . .” (bracketed alterations in 
original) (quoting Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 
1985))).
35 See, e.g., Coltec, 454 F.3d at 1355 (“[A] lack of economic substance is sufficient 
to disqualify the transaction without proof that the taxpayer’s sole motive is tax 
avoidance.”). 
36 ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 1998). 
37 See Joshua D. Blank, What’s Wrong with Shaming Corporate Tax Abuse, 62 TAX L.
REV. (forthcoming 2009) (“At the time corporations entered into [tax-shelter] transac-
tions, no tax rules explicitly prohibited them. . . . The IRS, and at least some courts, 
however, concluded that these transactions were corporate tax shelters because they 
violated broad judicial tax standards.”); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role 
of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339, 362-68 (2005) (discussing judicial anti-abuse 
doctrines and noting that “the tax law can be characterized by significant substantive 
uncertainty”); Weisbach, supra note 3, at 89-90 (“[A]nti-avoidance doctrines can be 
analyzed through a rules/standards analysis.  Anti-avoidance doctrines are stan-
dards. . . .”); see also David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 
865-67 (1999) (discussing rules versus standards in tax law). 
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created ex post, not ex ante.38  That tax shelters’ illegality is deter-
mined ex post, by judicial review, shapes the very definition of what it 
means for a transaction to be “correct” for tax purposes, as the next 
Section explains. 
B.  The Meaning of Correctness 
To know a tax position’s chance of being correct, we must first 
know what it means for a tax position to be correct.  While we may 
struggle to understand what it means for the Giants to have a 75% 
chance of winning their next football game, we know what it means 
for them to win a football game:  at the end of the game, the Giants 
have more points than the other team.  It is not as obvious, however, 
what it means for a tax position to be correct. 
As explained in the previous Section, whether a transaction is an 
illegal tax shelter is determined after the transaction is entered into 
because tax shelters are forbidden not only by detailed statutory rules, 
but also by standards, in the form of judicial anti-abuse doctrines.  
Therefore, for the purpose of determining penalties, and thus for the 
purpose of considering deterrence, statutes and regulations provide 
that a tax position is correct if it would be upheld by a court.  Put an-
other way, a tax position is correct if and only if the taxpayer would 
ultimately prevail should the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) chal-
lenge the tax position.39  A position is incorrect if a court would strike 
down the position. 
To determine whether a tax position is incorrect, however, a tax-
payer may not simply resolve the question of whether a court will in
fact strike down her tax position.  By far the most common way that a 
court would fail to strike down a tax position would be that no court 
would ever review the transaction.  For a court to review the transac-
tion, the taxpayer would have to be selected for audit.  The chances of 
38 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 
618 n.180 (1992) (noting that the tax law governing sham transactions consists of rela-
tively “open-ended” standards). 
39 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6664(d)(3)(A)(ii) (2006) (stating that a taxpayer’s belief that 
her tax treatment of an item is correct is reasonable only if the belief relates “solely to 
the taxpayer’s chances of success on the merits of such treatment”); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.6662-4(g)(4)(i) (1995) (stating that a taxpayer has a reasonable belief that “the tax 
treatment of an item is more likely than not the proper tax treatment” if “[t]he tax-
payer . . . reasonably concludes . . . that there is a greater than 50-percent likelihood 
that the tax treatment of the item will be upheld if challenged by the Internal Revenue 
Service”).
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audit vary based on the taxpayer, but audit rates are generally low.40
Even if the taxpayer is selected for audit, a court reviews the transac-
tion only if the taxpayer and the IRS fail to reach a settlement, which 
is highly unlikely, because the vast majority of audits result in settle-
ments, not substantive court decisions.41  The chance that a court will 
actually strike down a tax position is thus very low. 
The law does not, therefore, allow a taxpayer to take into account 
the chances that the transaction will be reviewed when she is consider-
ing whether a court would strike it down.42  In other words, the tax-
payer is not trying to answer the question, “Will a court strike down 
this transaction?”  The answer to that question will almost always be, 
“No, because a court will not review this transaction.”  Rather, the law 
requires the taxpayer to answer the question, “On the off chance that 
a court were to review this transaction, would the court strike it down?”  
But this question is almost always counterfactual, because in almost 
every case, no court will review the transaction. 
A useful way to think about whether a tax position is correct is to 
imagine tax positions arrayed along a continuum.  As one moves from 
40 For example, in fiscal year 2007, the audit rate was 1.03% for individuals overall 
and 0.66% for business returns overall.  The IRS focused its resources on high-earning 
corporations and individuals, but even those audit rates were not overwhelming:  the 
audit rate for large corporations (i.e., corporations with assets of at least $10 million) 
was 16.8%, and the audit rate for individuals with income of more than $1 million was 
9.25%.  The audit rate for very large corporations (i.e., corporations with assets of at 
least $250 million) was 27.2%.  IRS, FISCAL YEAR 2007 IRS ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE 
STATISTICS (2008), http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/irs_enforcement_and_service_ 
tables_fy_2007.pdf. 
41 Although it is difficult to determine precisely how many audits are resolved by a 
court decision, we can get a very rough sense of the ratio of audits to cases by compar-
ing their relative numbers in a single year.  In 2007, for example, according to a West-
law search, there were 1228 federal trial-level income-tax-related decisions.  (This was 
the number of documents returned when searching for income tax decisions in 2007 
in district courts, the Court of Federal Claims, and the Tax Court.  The specific search 
was [da(2007) & “income tax”] in the databases FTX-DCT, FTX-FEDCL, and FTX-
TCT.)  This number is both over- and underinclusive if we are trying simply to deter-
mine the number of substantive income-tax issues resolved by a trial-level court in 
2007; for example, it includes cases requesting enforcement of tax summonses and it 
does not include some jury cases.  Nonetheless, it provides an order of magnitude.  By 
comparison, in 2007 the IRS audited 1,550,922 returns.  IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 2007, at 23 tbl.9.  Thus, in 2007, there were 
approximately 1200 times more audits performed than trial-level tax decisions. 
42 See I.R.C. § 6664(d)(3)(A)(ii) (2006) (stating that a taxpayer’s belief as to the 
legality of her tax position is reasonable only if that belief “does not take into account 
the possibility that a return will not be audited”). 
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left to right along this continuum, tax positions become more likely to 
be upheld if reviewed by a court, as depicted in Figure 1. 
Figure 1:  The Tax Compliance Continuum43
chance of being 
upheld by a court 
0% 50% 90% 100%
(complete certainty 
of prevailing) 
 Placing tax positions on this continuum is difficult because such a 
placement requires a taxpayer to predict the future—specifically, to 
predict what a court would do in the future if it were to review the 
transaction.44  As the next Section explains, because of this uncer-
tainty, the tax compliance continuum should be interpreted subjec-
tively and taken to represent an ordering of beliefs. 
C.  Compliance Under Uncertainty 
This Section argues that because it is uncertain ex ante whether a 
transaction is permitted by tax law, the best way to understand the tax 
compliance continuum—indeed, the only understanding that makes 
sense—is to interpret the probabilities on that continuum as state-
ments of belief.  That is, we should interpret the continuum in terms 
of subjective probability.  This Section first shows why a frequentist in-
43 This rendering of the tax continuum is mine, but the idea of the tax continuum 
appears in both EXECUTIVE TASK FORCE, COMMISSIONER’S PENALTY STUDY, IRS, RE-
PORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, at VIII-38 to -39 (1989), and Logue, supra note 37, at 
352-62, 360 fig.1.  The general idea of a probability continuum may be traced back at 
least as far as Keynes: 
 The so-called magnitudes or degrees of knowledge or probability, in virtue of 
which one is greater and another less, really arise out of an order in which it is 
possible to place them.  Certainty, impossibility, and a probability, which has 
an intermediate value, for example, constitute an ordered series in which 
probability lies between certainty and impossibility.  In the same way there may 
exist a second probability which lies between certainty and the first probability.  
When, therefore, we say that one probability is greater than another, this pre-
cisely means that the degree of our rational belief in the first case lies between
certainty and the degree of our rational belief in the second case. 
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 35 (MacMillan & Co. 1948) (1921). 
44 Cf. Michael Abramowicz, Predictive Decisionmaking, 92 VA. L. REV. 69, 69-72 
(2006) (advocating the government’s increased use of predictive, as opposed to nor-
mative, decision making). 
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terpretation of the tax compliance continuum fails and then explains 
why a subjectivist interpretation avoids the problems presented by a 
frequentist interpretation. 
1.  Frequentist Interpretation 
Let us imagine a position that falls at the 90% mark on the tax 
compliance continuum in Figure 1.  This location means that the po-
sition has a 90% chance of being upheld by a court.  But how should 
we interpret this 90% as applied to a single position?  We might begin 
with a frequentist interpretation, which may be defined in terms of 
underlying classes or, equivalently, may be defined in terms of con-
verging frequencies:  over the long run, given repeated samples, the 
ratio of correct positions to total positions will converge on nine out 
of ten.  So perhaps our 90% means that there is an underlying class of 
positions like this position, and 90% percent of the members of the 
class of positions like this one are “correct” and ten percent are “in-
correct.”  Alternatively, we could say that courts uphold 90% of the 
positions that they review that are like this position.  If this were the 
right interpretation, then it would also be true that over the long run, 
if a taxpayer continued to take these 90% positions on her return, 
nine out of every ten positions would be correct and one would be in-
correct, or if we could run the same event (a court reviewing this posi-
tion) over and over, the court would uphold this position 90% of the 
time.  But this is not a useful interpretation for three reasons. 
First, whether a given position is “correct” under U.S. law is not a 
numbers game.  For example, if a court of appeals has upheld a posi-
tion, then the position is “correct” in that circuit, even if twenty dis-
trict courts in that circuit had previously struck it down.  So if it is truly 
uncertain how the position will be resolved, then it must be true that 
no controlling authority has made a determination about whether the 
position is “correct.”  Perhaps ten other courts of appeals have evalu-
ated the position and nine of them have upheld it.  But there might 
be additional information we have about the eleventh circuit in which 
this case would be decided that suggests to us that the outcome would 
be different there.  Similarly, perhaps nine out of ten Tax Court 
judges would uphold the position.  But again, this is not how law is 
made; if five out of nine Supreme Court Justices would strike it down, 
then the position is not correct. 
Second, such a description suggests that correctness and incor-
rectness inhere in the positions themselves; it suggests that correctness 
is a separate category that reveals an underlying truth about the posi-
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tion.  Presumably, though, the position has been subject to close scru-
tiny already, perhaps by the taxpayer’s lawyer or by an accounting 
firm.  If correctness is a quality that inheres in the position—that is, if 
correctness is an on/off switch—it seems odd that a tax lawyer could 
not discover it but that a court could.  Moreover, as discussed above, 
tax law does not inquire into abstract or underlying correctness; it 
recognizes correctness as a characteristic that is created by a court. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly for this project, there is no 
obvious way to determine what positions fall into this class.  Within 
one circuit, perhaps ten tax positions have come before the court and 
nine of them have been upheld.  But the court does not make deci-
sions by rolling a ten-sided die and striking down the tax position if 
the die shows a ten.  The decisions are highly fact specific and highly 
contingent.  Knowing that nine out of ten “similar” positions have 
been upheld does not tell us that there is a 90% chance that this par-
ticular position will be upheld or that if the court looks at all ten of 
the positions on the taxpayer’s return, it will find nine of them to be 
correct.
In other words, it is very difficult to tell what it means for the posi-
tion in question to be “like” another position; there is no certain way 
to determine the reference class.  The question of degrees of similar-
ity between tax positions is difficult.  For example, the IRS requires 
taxpayers to report certain transactions, sensibly called “reportable 
transactions,” on a separate tax form.45  The IRS believes that these 
types of transactions have a higher probability of being transactions of 
which the IRS would disapprove, and so it wants taxpayers to highlight 
those transactions on their returns.46  One type of reportable transac-
tion is a “listed transaction,” which is either a transaction that the IRS 
has determined is a tax-avoidance transaction, or, interestingly, a 
transaction that is “substantially similar” to a transaction that has been 
45 See I.R.C. § 6707 (2006) (imposing a penalty for failure to file a return with re-
spect to a reportable transaction). 
46 For further discussion of reportable transactions and penalties related to those 
transactions, see infra text accompanying notes 88-97.  The reportable transaction sys-
tem may also be effective in part because people do not want to draw the IRS’s atten-
tion to their tax returns and thus may overweight the downside of having to file the 
additional form.  Cf. Tom Herman, Fear of the Home-Office Deduction, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
16, 2008, at D3 (explaining that many taxpayers do not take the home-office deduction 
because they overweight the chance that taking the deduction will cause their returns 
to be audited). 
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determined to be a tax-avoidance transaction.47  The concern here, of 
course, is that the IRS describes listed transactions very specifically, 
and a rule that required taxpayers to report only those transactions 
that were identical to listed transactions would be very easy to avoid. 
For example, the IRS has designated as a listed transaction some-
thing that it calls an “intermediary transaction.”48  As described by the 
IRS, this transaction involves four parties:  a target corporation, a 
seller who wants to sell stock of the target corporation, an intermedi-
ary corporation, and a buyer who wants to purchase the assets, not the 
stock, of the target corporation.49  The seller purports to sell the tar-
get’s stock to the intermediary, and the target claims to sell its assets to 
the purchaser.  After the purported sale to the intermediary, the tar-
get and the intermediary belong to the same consolidated group.  
There is gain on the sale of the target’s assets to the buyer, but that 
gain is offset by losses within the consolidated group, or the tax on the 
sale of the assets is offset by tax credits available to the consolidated 
group.
A transaction would be substantially similar to this listed transac-
tion even if the intermediary is not treated as a member of the same 
consolidated group as the target.50  For example, a substantially simi-
lar transaction might be structured so that the intermediary does not 
file as a member of the consolidated group that includes the target, 
but rather purchases and liquidates the target51 and then sells the tar-
get’s assets, offsetting the gain (or tax) on the sale of the low-basis as-
sets with losses (or credits).52
The similarity between these two structures is fairly obvious.  In 
each case, an entity with losses or credits purchases the stock of the 
47 Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (as amended in 2007).  These transactions are 
sometimes called “midco transactions,” after the “middle” (intermediary) company.  
See, e.g., Sam Young, No Immediate Relief from “Midco” Transaction Notice, Official Says, TAX 
NOTES TODAY, June 25, 2008, 2008 TNT 123-5 ( LEXIS). 
48 I.R.S. Notice 2001-16, 2001-9 I.R.B. 730. 
49 This scenario might arise, for example, when the seller has a high basis in the 
stock and the target has a low basis in the assets. 
50 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(c)(4) (as amended in 2007). 
51 The liquidation would be tax free.  See I.R.C. § 332(a) (2006) (“No gain or loss 
shall be recognized on the receipt by a corporation of property distributed in complete 
liquidation of another corporation.”). 
52 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(c)(4), ex. 2 (as amended in 2007) (“An example is a 
transaction in which [the intermediary] is a corporation that does not file a consoli-
dated return but which buys [another corporation’s (T)] stock, liquidates T, sells assets 
of T to [a buyer], and offsets the gain on the sale of those assets with currently gener-
ated losses.”). 
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target corporation and combines in some way with the target corpora-
tion in order to permit those losses or credits to offset gain or tax 
from the sale of the target’s assets.  But is a transaction substantially 
similar to an intermediary transaction if there is no intermediary?  Af-
ter the IRS first issued guidance classifying intermediary transactions 
as listed transactions, some practitioners took the position that the an-
swer to this question was “no”:  these practitioners marketed a transac-
tion in which a third party purchased stock in a closely held corpora-
tion after the corporation sold its assets in an (ostensibly) unrelated 
asset sale but before it liquidated.  This transaction had, they argued, 
no intermediary, so how could it be substantially similar to an inter-
mediary transaction?53  In response, the IRS issued additional guid-
ance that attempted to refine the concept of an intermediary transac-
tion by shifting the focus from an “intermediary” to a facilitator.54
As this back and forth suggests, defining “substantially similar” in 
the abstract is not so easy.  The IRS’s definition is that one transaction 
is substantially similar to a listed transaction if it is “expected to obtain 
the same or similar types of tax consequences and . . . is either factu-
ally similar [to] or based on the same or similar tax strategy.”55  This 
definition is not terribly helpful.  Presumably all tax strategies are de-
signed to obtain the same tax consequences in some larger sense:  re-
duction of tax.  Moreover, the criterion of being factually similar to or 
based on a “similar tax strategy” simply does not help refine the in-
quiry—when is a tax strategy “similar” to another tax strategy?  For 
that matter, what is a “tax strategy”?  Is the tax strategy in the listed in-
termediary transaction merely that the party who purchases the stock 
is tax indifferent for some reason?  Is the mere presence of a tax-
indifferent party enough to make a transaction substantially similar to 
the listed intermediary transaction?56
53 Letter from David S. Miller, Chair, Tax Section, N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, to Eric 
Solomon, Assistant Sec’y (Tax Policy), Dep’t of the Treasury, and Douglas Shulman, 
Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv. 3 (May 23, 2008), available at http://www.nysba.org/ 
AM/Template.cfm?Section=Mission_Statement4 (click “Tax Section Reports 2008” 
link on left side of page; then click “1156” link). 
54 See I.R.S. Notice 2008-20, 2008-6 I.R.B. 406 (identifying the components of an 
Intermediary Transaction Tax Shelter). 
55 Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(c)(4).
56 The IRS, in its corporate-tax-shelter check sheet, tells its examiners that the 
presence of a tax-indifferent party is one of nine characteristics of corporate tax shel-
ters.  Internal Revenue Serv., Examination Guide—Abusive Tax Shelters and Transac-
tions § III.E.2, reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY, May 27, 2005, 2005 TNT 102-14 (LEXIS).
2009] Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertainty 1041
It is probably not accidental that the definition of “substantially 
similar” is so broad as to provide almost no guidance and that this 
broad definition must itself be “broadly construed in favor of disclo-
sure.”57  The definition of “substantially similar” was added to the 
regulations because some taxpayers were “ma[king] subtle and insig-
nificant changes to a listed transaction in order to claim that their 
transactions [were] not subject to disclosure.”58  The broad definition 
of “substantially similar” permits the IRS to punish taxpayers who are 
trying to sneak through what the IRS believes to be a tax shelter.  In 
short, the IRS essentially has left to itself the judgment of whether a 
transaction is substantially similar to a listed transaction, perhaps 
thinking that it will know it when it sees it, because similarity in this 
context is difficult to define precisely. 
While a frequentist interpretation of the compliance continuum 
does not, for the reasons described in this subsection, accurately de-
scribe tax probabilities, a subjectivist interpretation of the continuum 
provides a useful way to understand tax compliance, as the next sub-
section explains. 
2.  Subjectivist Interpretation 
In contrast to the frequentist interpretation of the continuum set 
forth above, a subjectivist interpretation takes the statement “the tax 
position has a 90% chance of being upheld” to reflect the speaker’s 
degree of belief in that statement.  In other words, using the betting 
analogy described above, the speaker would set fair odds for this 
proposition at nine to one.  Put another way, she would be willing to 
pay ninety cents for a chance to win a dollar if the position would be 
upheld by a court.59
This interpretation makes sense for precisely the reasons that a 
frequentist interpretation does not.  Deciding whether the position 
will be upheld is not a decision under risk; we do not know the under-
lying probability that the position will be upheld.  Rather, it is a deci-
sion under uncertainty.  As described above, there is no way to tell 
57 Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(c)(4). 
58 T.D. 9000, 2002-2 C.B. 87, 88. 
59 There are, of course, problems with this interpretation, as discussed supra text 
accompanying notes 23-24.  For example, as mentioned above, perhaps the speaker 
does not like to bet or doubts that the bet will ever be paid off because courts rarely 
review tax positions.  But these objections to the betting interpretation do not affect 
this Section’s analysis. 
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with certainty what sort of tax position we are dealing with—e.g., is it 
the sort of tax position that is upheld 90% of the time?  When faced 
with a decision under uncertainty, a subjective interpretation of prob-
ability is the best that we can do. 
It is true, of course, that interpreting the statement as a statement 
about belief means that the taxpayer is being asked to quantify the 
strength of her belief about something that has not yet happened and 
probably never will:  as discussed above, the question of whether a tax 
position is correct is a question about an event (review by a court) that 
will probably never occur.  But the simple fact that this is a question 
about a counterfactual does not prevent people from forming beliefs 
about its answer.  People form beliefs—sometimes quite strong be-
liefs60—about counterfactuals all the time, and some counterfactual 
statements seem more true than others.61
A subjective interpretation of the statement also explains the em-
phasis placed on the role of the tax advisor.  Most taxpayers do not 
have the expertise that would allow them to form a judgment about a 
tax position based on current tax law (simply because most taxpayers 
do not know the details of current tax law).  Therefore, tax law per-
mits a taxpayer to rely on the advice of a professional tax advisor to 
60 These strong beliefs seem to arise frequently in scenarios about World War II and 
about sports.  See, e.g., BEVIN ALEXANDER, HOW HITLER COULD HAVE WON WORLD WAR 
II, at x-xii (2000) (exploring opportunities that could have led Hitler to build an “un-
assailable” continental empire); GAVRIEL D. ROSENFELD, THE WORLD HITLER NEVER 
MADE: ALTERNATE HISTORY AND THE MEMORY OF NAZISM (2005).  Another example is 
Saturday Night Live:  Bill Swerski’s Super Fans (NBC television broadcast Jan. 12, 1991):  
 Bill Swerski:  Now, gentlemen, let me ask you this:  What if Da Bears were all 
14 inches tall, you know, about so high?  Now, what’s your score of today’s 
game?
 Carl Wollarski:  Against Da Giants? 
 Bill Swerski:  Yes, give ‘em a handicap. 
 Carl Wollarski:  Bears 18, Giants 10.  And that would finally be a good game. 
 Pat Arnold:  Yeah, it would be a good game.  Mini Bears 24, Giants 14. 
 Todd O’Conner:  What about Ditka?  Would he be mini, too? 
 Bill Swerski:  No, he would be full-grown. 
 Todd O’Conner:  Oh, then, uh . . . Mini Bears 31, Giants 7. 
 Carl Wollarski:  Oh, hold on.  Then I change mine, too.  I thought it was 
Mini Ditka. 
61 See generally DAVID LEWIS, COUNTERFACTUALS (1973) (explaining the “possible 
worlds” approach). 
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avoid accuracy-related penalties.62  To prevent imposition of a penalty, 
this reliance must be reasonable.63  The opinion itself must also be 
reasonable, as only a reasonable opinion provides penalty protection; 
an opinion provides no protection if it “is based on unreasonable fac-
tual or legal assumptions,” including “assumptions as to future 
events.”64  This emphasis on tax advisors makes sense because given 
that the counterfactual statement should be interpreted as a statement 
of belief, we have to know whose belief it is.  There is no continuum 
except that which is attached to a particular person; a position does 
not fall on the continuum, but rather is placed there by a particular 
someone with a particular set of information.  If positions do not have 
probabilities, in the abstract, then it matters who assigns the probabil-
ity to the position.  It matters whose belief we are capturing. 
Finally, a subjectivist interpretation of the statement can be en-
tirely consistent with an economic analysis.  Economic models, even 
neoclassical economic models, have long taken into account that 
many expected utilities are formed based on individuals’ beliefs about 
the likelihood that an event will occur, rather than any external 
“truth” about likelihood of apprehension.65  A choice-theoretic ap-
proach to probabilities (i.e., deriving probabilities from choices, as 
opposed to external “reality”) appeared at least as early as 1931.66
It is true that for a purely theoretical, economic analysis, it may be 
harmless to smooth over the difference between frequentist and sub-
jectivist interpretations of probability.  For example, Becker, in what is 
widely accepted as the seminal modern law and economics article, de-
fines p, the factor by which to weight the expected cost of an offense, 
as the “probability of conviction per offense.”67  He discusses else-
where in the article the “actual probabilities” of convictions, which he 
62 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c) (as amended in 2003) (describing the minimum 
requirements for relying on tax advice). 
63 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1) (as amended in 2003) (mandating analysis of 
“all facts and circumstances” as a prerequisite to reasonableness).  The reliance must 
also be in good faith.  Id.
64 I.R.C. § 6664(d)(3)(B)(iii) (2006).  For further discussion of the tax advisor’s 
role, see infra Section III.B. 
65 See, e.g., Itzhak Gilboa et al., Probability and Uncertainty in Economic Modeling
(Penn Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 08-002, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1088122. 
66 See, e.g., Mark  J. Machina & David Schmeidler, A More Robust Definition of Subjec-
tive Probability, in 2 THE ECONOMICS OF UNCERTAINTY 745, 746-47 ( John D. Hey ed., 
1997) (describing Frank Ramsey’s work on the subjective approach to probability). 
67 Becker, supra note 2, at 177. 
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determines by dividing the estimated number of convictions by the es-
timated number of offenses.68  Summarizing Becker’s “pathbreaking” 
article some years later, Erling Eide writes that in Becker’s account, 
“[p] is the subjective probability of being caught and convicted.”69
While this may be, for the reasons described in this Section, the cor-
rect interpretation of p, it is not how Becker’s article defines p.  But 
apparently Eide considers the difference between the two accounts of 
no moment for his larger point, which is to describe the basic law and 
economics analysis of crime and punishment based on the idea of a 
rational utility maximizer. 
More generally, an expected-utility analysis can be used in an ide-
alized model even if the model describes conditions of uncertainty.  
Thus, the probabilities involved are subjective probabilities, if indi-
viduals’ subjective probabilities are assumed to adhere to certain pos-
tulates.70  To model conditions of uncertainty in economics, then, one 
assumes that individuals have “rational” probabilistic beliefs and be-
have to maximize their own subjective expected utility.  This essen-
tially reduces the question to one of risk, rather than uncertainty.71
As Part III explains, however, when economic theories serve as the 
basis for real-world recommendations, attending to the distinction be-
tween frequentist and subjectivist probabilities can make a significant 
difference. 
3.  Uncertainty Restated 
The distinction between risk and uncertainty, and thus between 
frequentist and subjective interpretations of probability, can also be 
incorporated into a formal model.  For example, Kaplow has provided 
a model that describes deterrence when individuals are uncertain 
whether their acts will be subject to sanctions.72  Uncertainty can, he 
points out, stem either from an individual’s lack of knowledge about 
the law or from a lack of knowledge about the acts in which the indi-
vidual is engaging.73  Kaplow first posits an informed individual, that 
68 Id. at 186, 187 tbl.2. 
69 Erling Eide, Economics of Criminal Behavior, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LITIGATION 345, 346 (Boudewijn 
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). 
70 See, e.g., SAVAGE, supra note 22. 
71 See, e.g., Gilboa et al., supra note 65, at 2. 
72 See Louis Kaplow, Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Infor-
mation About Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1990). 
73 Id. at 93. 
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is, an individual who knows that her act is illegal.74  Such an individual 
should commit an illegal act only when the benefit of the act to her 
exceeds the expected sanction,75 where the expected sanction (ps)
equals the probability of detection (p) multiplied by the sanction (s). 
Kaplow then posits an uninformed individual, one who does not 
know whether her act is illegal.  Such an individual will act when the 
benefit of acting exceeds pqs, where q is what the individual believes to 
be the probability that her act is illegal.76  Kaplow imagines a world in 
which an individual can, if she chooses, pay a certain amount to learn 
whether her act is illegal.77  Every uninformed individual can there-
fore choose to become informed. 
My argument, as laid out in this Part, is that all individuals are un-
informed about many tax positions, and necessarily so.  The illegal act 
(or, in Kaplow’s terms, the harmful act) is taking an incorrect tax po-
sition.  Some few taxpayer-favorable positions are clearly wrong (for 
example, the position that nobody is required to pay taxes).  Perhaps 
some few taxpayer-favorable positions are clearly right (for example, 
the position that a corporation may deduct salaries), though one can 
argue about the meaning of terms even in clearly correct positions (a 
corporation may not deduct excessive salary payments, and the mean-
ing of “excessive” is far from clear).  But a taxpayer who considers a 
position outside of those few clear positions cannot know with cer-
tainty whether that position is incorrect—that is, taxpayers do not 
know whether most acts are permitted.  Kaplow’s q term appears in 
every taxpayer’s calculation.  As the next Part discusses, this uncer-
tainty, and the accompanying subjectivist interpretation of probability 
statements regarding the correctness of tax positions, has practical 
implications for tax law. 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF UNCERTAINTY
This Part shows that analyses of tax compliance are affected by 
taking the fact of subjective probabilities into account in at least three 
ways.  First, taking into account disparate beliefs about the probability 
74 While Kaplow grounds his model in terms of harmfulness, he equates harm and 
illegality.  See id. at 96 (“If and only if an act is harmful is it illegal, in which case there 
is some probability that the act will be detected and the individual penalized.”). 
75 Id. at 97.  Both the benefit and the sanction are measured in monetary 
equivalents. 
76 Id. at 98. 
77 Id. at 101-02. 
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that a tax position is correct challenges certain commonly accepted 
conclusions based on economic modeling, in particular the conclu-
sion that a fault-based penalty system is necessarily not optimal.  Sec-
ond, a subjectivist interpretation of tax probabilities provides addi-
tional support for stringent and much-criticized laws that regulate the 
substance of tax advisors’ written opinions, as these strict rules may ac-
tually help tax advisors arrive at more accurate, less biased estimates of 
the chance that a tax position would be upheld by a court.  And fi-
nally, lawmakers should be cautious before reducing tax law’s uncer-
tainty.  If, as empirical work suggests, some taxpayers have an aversion 
to uncertainty, the uncertainty associated with whether certain ques-
tionable transactions are permitted (aside from any penalties imposed 
if transactions do turn out to be forbidden) may itself reduce the 
number of taxpayers who engage in those transactions. 
Section III.A provides one example of how disparate beliefs can 
play out within the tax penalty systems by showing how acknowledging 
that parties’ beliefs may differ could affect whether penalties should 
be fault-based.  Section III.B discusses the regulation of tax advisors in 
light of the subjective nature of tax probability statements.  Section 
III.C suggests that, given that tax probability statements are best inter-
preted as subjectivist, future models of tax compliance should take 
into account uncertainty aversion—that is, that some people may pre-
fer not to engage in activities for which they do not know the chance 
of success. 
A.  Accounting for Disparate Beliefs 
Because tax probabilities are subjective probabilities, different ac-
tors may have different beliefs about the chance that a particular tax 
position is correct.  This Section provides one example of how varying 
views between lawmakers and citizens can affect how a tax system 
would be structured to deter tax evasion optimally. 
The current system of tax penalties in the United States is in part 
fault-based.  The argument has been made that a law and economics 
approach to tax policy suggests that fault-based penalties are not op-
timal.78  This Section describes the fault-based penalty structure and 
then explains how a subjectivist interpretation of the tax continuum 
shows that fault-based penalties can be consistent with marginal-
78 See Daniel Shaviro, Disclosure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal Response to 
Tax Shelters, in TAX AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 229 (Wolfgang Schön ed., 2008). 
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deterrence theory.  In particular, if lawmakers’ views about the chance 
of correctness of certain tax positions vary from taxpayers’ views, mar-
ginal-deterrence theory may actually require fault-based penalties. 
1.  The Fault-Based Penalty Structure 
A taxpayer who underpays her taxes faces an array of possible civil 
penalties.  This subsection focuses on two underpayment penalties 
that can be imposed on taxpayers who engage in transactions that may 
be tax shelters:  a general accuracy-related penalty that can be im-
posed on substantial understatements of tax, and an accuracy-related 
penalty that can be imposed on transactions that the IRS feels are par-
ticularly likely to be tax evasion or avoidance strategies. 
a.  Substantial Understatement Penalty 
A taxpayer who underpays her tax is subject to an accuracy-related 
penalty equal to 20% of the underpayment if, among other things, the 
underpayment is due to a “substantial understatement” of tax.79  An 
understatement is “substantial” if it “exceeds the greater of . . . 10 per-
cent of the tax required to be shown on the return . . . or $5000.”80
The taxpayer may escape the penalty in three ways.  First, a tax-
payer is excused from the substantial understatement penalty if there 
was “reasonable cause” for her substantial understatement and she 
“acted in good faith” with respect to the understatement.81  Reason-
able cause and good faith, for these purposes, are case-by-case deter-
minations.82  Second, a taxpayer need not pay the penalty if she had 
“substantial authority” for the position that resulted in the underpay-
ment.83  “Substantial authority” has been estimated as a 35% to 40% 
chance of success.84  Finally, the taxpayer also need not pay the pen-
alty if she disclosed the position on her tax return and had a “reason-
79 I.R.C. § 6662(a)-(b) (2006). 
80 Id. § 6662(d)(1)(A). 
81 Id. § 6664(c)(1). 
82 Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b) (as amended in 2003). 
83 I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i). 
84 See, e.g., Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., The Range of Legal Tax Opinions, with Emphasis 
on the “Should” Opinion, 98 TAX NOTES 1125, 1128 (2003) (collecting sources approxi-
mating what is meant by “substantial authority”). 
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able basis” for that position.85  A “reasonable basis” has been viewed as 
having anywhere from a 10% to 25% chance of success.86
b.  Reportable Transaction Penalty 
In response to growing concerns about tax shelters, Congress cre-
ated a new accuracy-related penalty in 2004 meant to target transac-
tions deemed particularly suspicious.87  This new penalty equals 20% 
of a tax understatement related to a “reportable transaction,” if a sig-
nificant purpose of entering into the transaction was “avoidance or 
evasion of Federal income tax.”88  A “reportable transaction” is a trans-
action of the sort that the IRS has identified as “having a potential for 
tax avoidance or evasion.”89  The category of reportable transactions is 
quite broad:  current reportable transactions include transactions of-
fered to taxpayers “under conditions of confidentiality”; transactions 
for which the taxpayer has the right to a refund if the promised tax 
consequences do not materialize; and transactions that result in a 
large tax loss.90
Reportable transactions also include “transactions of interest.”91
Transactions of interest are specific transactions, described in detail 
by the IRS, or transactions that are substantially similar to those spe-
cifically described.92  Transactions of interest are transactions that the 
IRS and the Treasury Department believe have the potential to be tax-
avoidance transactions but for which they need more information to 
definitively arrive at such a conclusion.93  If the IRS and Treasury ob-
tain more information and conclude that transactions of interest are 
tax-avoidance transactions, the transactions will presumably become 
“listed transactions.” 
85 I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii). 
86 See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 84, at 1127 (collecting sources approximating 
what is meant by “reasonable basis”). 
87 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 812(a), 118 Stat. 
1418, 1577-80 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6662A). 
88 I.R.C. § 6662A(b)(2)(B). 
89 Id. § 6707A(c)(1). 
90 Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) (as amended in 2007). 
91 Id. § 1.6011-4(b)(6). 
92 Id.
93 T.D. 9350, 2007-38 I.R.B. 607, 608. 
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Listed transactions are the final category of reportable transac-
tions.94  Like transactions of interest, listed transactions are specifically 
described by the IRS and also include substantially similar transac-
tions.95  Listed transactions are, in Treasury’s view, tax-avoidance 
transactions (or, as they are more commonly known, tax shelters).  As 
might be expected, harsher rules apply to taxpayers who engage in 
listed transactions:  a 20% penalty is imposed on understatements 
stemming from listed transactions regardless of the taxpayer’s purpose 
for entering into that transaction.96
c.  Escaping the Penalties 
It is easier for a taxpayer to escape paying the substantial under-
payment penalty than to escape paying the reportable transaction 
penalty.  A taxpayer need not pay the substantial underpayment pen-
alty if she had reasonable cause for the underpayment and acted in 
good faith.97  The taxpayer escapes the reportable transaction penalty 
only if those two conditions are met and, in addition, she disclosed 
the transaction on her tax return, there was substantial authority for 
the position, and she reasonably believed that the treatment she re-
ported was more likely than not the proper treatment.98
A belief is reasonable for these purposes only if it “is based on the 
facts and law that exist at the time” that the taxpayer takes the posi-
tion.99  Tax law therefore requires a taxpayer and her advisor to con-
sider whether their beliefs are consonant with what they imagine 
other people’s beliefs would be if faced with the same question.  This 
rule permits the IRS to appeal to the beliefs of other taxpayers and 
experts, and it permits courts to impose penalties by looking outside 
of an individual’s belief.  By requiring beliefs to be reasonable, the law 
94 Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2).  See supra text accompanying notes 48-58 for addi-
tional discussion of listed transactions. 
95 I.R.C. § 6707A(c)(2) (2006). 
96 Id. § 6662A(b)(2). 
97 As discussed supra text accompanying notes 83-86, a taxpayer can also escape 
the general accuracy-related penalty if she had substantial authority for the item or if 
she disclosed the item and had a reasonable basis for her position.  In other words, ei-
ther substantial authority or good faith and reasonable cause are sufficient to avoid the 
general accuracy-related penalty, whereas both are required to escape the reportable 
transaction accuracy-related penalty, in addition to the taxpayer’s reasonable belief 
that her treatment of the tax item was more likely than not correct. 
98 I.R.C. § 6664(d). 
99 Id. § 6664(d)(3)(A)(i). 
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stymies tax protesters, who could avoid penalties entirely if a sincere 
individual belief was the only requirement for good faith.100
Finally, this reasonable belief cannot take into account the prob-
ability of audit.  In other words, the taxpayer must have believed that 
if the return were audited, the position were detected on the audit, 
and a court reviewed the position, the court would be more likely than 
not to uphold that position.101  The taxpayer cannot base her belief 
that her tax position will not be struck down on her belief that she will 
not be audited and that her tax position will therefore never be re-
viewed.
Thus, we see that to determine whether these penalties apply, the 
taxpayer or her advisor is asked about her predictions at three levels 
of (increasing) certainty:  whether there is a “reasonable basis” for her 
position, whether there is “substantial authority” for her position, and 
whether she believed her position is “more likely than not” the proper 
treatment.102
Figure 2:  The Penalty Continuum 
100 In contrast, Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), was a criminal case in 
which a tax protester was charged with willfully failing to file tax returns and willfully 
evading tax.  The Court found it possible “for a defendant to be ignorant of his duty 
based on an irrational belief that he has no duty” and held that this ignorance could 
negate willfulness.  Id. at 203.  A good-faith belief, in other words, could be objectively 
unreasonable.  This holding was based on case law that defined “willfully” in the con-
text of criminal tax statutes.  Id. at 200-01.  For further discussion of the objec-
tive/subjective distinction, see supra text accompanying notes 24-25. 
101 I.R.C. § 6664(d)(3)(A)(ii). 
102 A more detailed guide to degrees of certainty is available, but it may not be in-
tended completely seriously.  See A Detailed Guide to Tax Opinion Standards, 106 TAX
NOTES 1469 (2005) (stating, inter alia, that a 44% chance of success should be inter-
preted to mean “[i]f we get the right judge”; a 14% chance, “[m]aybe Enron would do 
this”; and a 5% chance, “[y]ou must not understand the legislation”). 
100%
(complete certainty of 
being struck down) 
Reportable transaction
penalty 
Substantial understatement 
penalty(no disclosure) 
Substantial understatement 
penalty (disclosure) 
chance of being 
struck down 
by a court 
0% 50% 65% 90%
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 We can imagine these penalties arrayed on a penalty continuum 
much like the compliance continuum, but, as shown in Figure 2, re-
versed, with an increasing chance of being struck down by a court.  
As the chance of the position’s being struck down by a court in-
creases, more penalties may be imposed.  In short, these are fault-
based penalties. 
2.  Fault-Based Penalties and Uncertainty 
It has been argued, in particular by Daniel Shaviro, that fault-
based tax penalties are inconsistent with marginal-deterrence the-
ory.103  In this view, these penalties “focus excessively on the taxpayer’s 
state of mind.”104  The fault-based nature of these penalties, the argu-
ment goes, merely incorporates an irrelevant mens rea element into 
tax penalties.  Thus, a penalty in this context simply “worsens the 
company’s betting odds” on taking a particular tax position.105  The 
purpose of penalties, in this view, is to “properly align[] corporate 
taxpayers’ incentives.”106
Interpreting probability statements as statements about belief 
makes clear, however, that fault-based penalties are not necessarily in-
consistent with, and in fact may be required by, marginal-deterrence 
theory.  A subjectivist interpretation reveals that a taxpayer’s positions 
will not converge over the long run.  More crucially, because lawmak-
ers do not know the precise expected harm of tax positions, marginal-
deterrence theory may actually require fault-based penalties, depend-
ing on the relationship between Congress’s view of a transaction and 
the taxpayer’s view of that same transaction. 
a.  No Convergence 
Shaviro claims that “a taxpayer who . . . tak[es] ten potentially 
controversial tax return positions, each of which has a [ninety] per-
cent chance of being correct . . . is likely to have, ex post, one error on 
103 Shaviro, supra note 78.  Kyle Logue also argues against a fault-based penalty re-
gime, but his argument is based primarily on the nonadministrability of a fault-based 
regime, and although his analysis nominally uses optimal tax theory, his suggestions 
for changing the penalty regime are based on the application of a fault-based regime 
to the real world.  Kyle Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law Is Un-
certain, 27 VA. TAX REV. 241, 280-93 (2007). 
104 Shaviro, supra note 78, at 230. 
105 Id.
106 Id. at 231. 
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the tax return in its own favor.”107  He argues that there is therefore 
no relevant difference between this taxpayer and “a taxpayer who does 
one transaction with zero chance of being correct.”108
This interpretation of the tax continuum is a frequentist interpre-
tation:  it appeals to the law of large numbers, the idea that if the “ex-
periment” is run enough times, it will converge on a certain number 
of “incorrect” outcomes.  But the law of large numbers does not apply 
if we interpret probabilities as subjective statements of degrees of be-
lief.  Understanding the statement as a subjective statement means 
that the “90%” number describes the level of certainty that a particu-
lar individual with particular information has in an outcome. 
Thus, there may be a great difference indeed between the tax-
payer who does ten transactions, each with a 90% chance of being 
correct, and a taxpayer who does one clearly incorrect transaction.  
We do not know that they will have, on average, the same number of 
errors on their returns.  We do know that the latter taxpayer, who 
does one clearly incorrect transaction, will have one error on her re-
turn.  But we do not know, even over the long run, how many errors 
the taxpayer with ten 90% positions will have on her return.  In fact, 
we do not even know what it means that the position has a 90% 
chance of being correct without knowing who holds that view and 
what information that person has.  A tax lawyer who could so accu-
rately characterize tax positions that over the long run the actual hold-
ings would converge on her subjective probabilities would not just be 
skilled; she would be psychic. 
b.  The Effect of Governmental Uncertainty 
More interestingly, if taxpayers’ views of acceptable transactions 
differ from lawmakers’ views, fault-based penalties may be required by 
marginal-deterrence theory.  Take the substantial understatement ac-
curacy-related penalty.  Just as a taxpayer, ex ante, is uncertain 
whether her tax position is illegitimate, so the government, ex ante, 
does not know the expected harm of the taxpayer’s position.  After all, 
Congress sets penalties (including deciding whether penalties are 
fault-based), but, as we have seen, courts decide whether a transaction 
is correct.  The institutional split between setting penalties, on the one 
hand, and deciding whether a transaction is correct, on the other, 
107 Id.
108 Id. at 237-38. 
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means that the penalty setter (Congress) is also unsure just which 
transactions are correct.  As a result, fault-based penalties are consis-
tent with marginal-deterrence theory, as this subsection explains. 
Kaplow tells us that the government should set the expected pen-
alty equal to the actual harm.109  Formally, let 
 = probability that the tax position is illegal (i.e., probability of 
harm);
 h = societal harm inflicted by an individual’s taking an illegal tax 
position (i.e., the difference between the societal utility of the tax 
collected without the transaction and the societal utility of the tax 
collected with the transaction); 
p = probability of detection; 
 q = perceived probability that the tax position is illegal (i.e., the 
taxpayer’s estimation of the probability that the transaction would 
be struck down by a court if reviewed); and 
s =  sanction.110
Kaplow suggests that to optimize penalties for informed actors (tax-
payers, for our purposes), the expected sanction should equal the ac-
tual expected harm to society, and to optimize penalties for unin-
formed actors, the perceived expected sanction should equal the 
actual expected harm.  The “actual expected harm” depends both on 
the amount of harm inflicted by an individual’s taking an illegal posi-
tion, h, and on the probability that the tax position is illegal, .111  The 
optimal relationship between harm and the sanction can therefore be 
written as: 
h = pqs [2]. 
It is possible to extend Kaplow’s model to show that marginal-
deterrence theory can require fault-based penalties.  Note that in the 
tax-shelter context, Congress, which sets penalties, does not know the 
chance that a transaction is illegal—that is, Congress does not know 
the value of .  Recall how tax shelters are struck down:  courts hold 
that the transactions are impermissible under judicial doctrines.  
109 Kaplow, supra note 71, at 99-100. 
110 The variables used here are also used in Kaplow’s model.  Id. at 97. 
111 This equation assumes that unpaid taxes result in societal harm, which might 
not be true. 
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Congress has declined to codify these doctrines.112  Thus, the substan-
tive law created by Congress, through its omissions, essentially says, 
“There shall be no harmful tax acts, and courts shall decide what is 
harmful.”  Courts then decide whether a tax act is harmful, based on 
the somewhat amorphous judicial doctrines described above.113  Be-
cause, as discussed above, these doctrines are standards rather than 
rules, whether a transaction is a tax shelter is determined after a tax-
payer engages in that transaction.114  Congress does not know what 
that decision will be.  In short, just as taxpayers face uncertainty about 
which tax acts are incorrect, Congress faces uncertainty about which 
tax acts are harmful.  We can now refine our definitions: 
 = lawmakers’ perceived probability of harm (i.e., lawmakers’ es-
timation of the probability that the transaction would be struck 
down by a court if reviewed); and 
 q = taxpayer’s perceived probability of harm (i.e., the taxpayer’s 
estimation of the probability that the transaction would be struck 
down by a court if reviewed). 
The importance of Congress’s uncertainty becomes apparent if 
Equation 2 is rewritten as 
hs
p q
.
According to this equation, if we hold h and p fixed, penalty levels 
should be set based not only on the taxpayer’s perceived probability of 
harm (q), but rather on the relationship between the taxpayer’s per-
ceived probability of harm and the lawmakers’ or government’s per-
ceived probability of harm ( ).  I have suggested that Congress does 
not know  with anything approaching certainty when it is setting 
penalties, because  is unknowable.  And we do not know that  and q
are independent.  If the government finds transactions more prob-
lematic than do taxpayers for some range of q, and increases faster 
112 Whether they should codify these doctrines is an issue of much contention.  
See, e.g., Donald L. Korb, Codification of the Judicial Economic Substance Doctrine, in TAX 
STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES,
FINANCING, REORGANIZATIONS AND RESTRUCTURINGS 2008, at 377, 392-95 (PLI Tax 
Law & Estate Planning Handbook Series No. 14,322, 2008) (describing the advantages 
and disadvantages of codifying the economic-substance doctrine). 
113 See supra Part II.A. 
114 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
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than q, the sanction should increase as transactions become more 
questionable. 
Of course, at some point, ’s acceleration relative to q would 
have to slow down because  cannot exceed 100%.  And if a taxpayer 
is 100% sure that her transaction is wrong, the government could 
not be more sure than the taxpayer that the position is incorrect.  
But the current penalty structure does not attempt to calibrate fault 
and amount of penalty closely.  Rather, penalties simply toggle:  they 
are imposed only when the taxpayer’s perceived probability of harm, 
q, reaches a certain level.  For example, a taxpayer is subject to the 
reportable transaction penalty only if q  50%.  This would make sense 
under marginal-deterrence theory if, with regard to reportable trans-
actions, the government tends to agree with the taxpayer when the 
taxpayer believes that the transaction is likely to be correct but tends 
to take a harsher view of the transaction than does the taxpayer when 
the taxpayer is less sure that the position is correct. 
For example, one might imagine  as a function of q, where if 
q < 50%,  = q, and if q  50%,  = 100% (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3
100%
(complete certainty of
being struck down)
chance of being
struck down
by a court
0% 50%
50%
100%
(complete certainty of
being struck down) 
Taxpayer’s
View (q) 
Government’s
View ( )
If this function accurately described the relationship between the 
government’s view and the taxpayer’s view, a graph of the ratio of 
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these two views (i.e., /q), as against the taxpayer’s view (q), would 
look something like Figure 4. 
The key point is that, as Figure 4 shows, /q is greater for q  50% 
than for q < 50%.  And therefore, because the sanction is a multiple of 
/q, the sanction should also be greater for q  50% than for q < 50%.  
In other words, if this is the relationship between  and q, then mar-
ginal-deterrence theory would require fault-based penalties:  penalties 
would be higher when the taxpayer believed with greater-than-50% 
certainty that her position was incorrect. 
Notice as well that different relationships between  and q for dif-
ferent types of transactions would explain why different penalties ap-
ply to reportable transactions than to other types of transactions.  
Perhaps discrepancies between taxpayers’ views and the government’s 
view tend to deviate sharply for reportable transactions starting at 
q = 50%, whereas for nonreportable transactions the deviation begins 
further along the penalty continuum, at, for example, q = 85%.  Or 
perhaps taxpayers who would choose to engage in transactions that 
have been targeted by the IRS as problematic tend to have beliefs 
about tax transactions that are especially discrepant from the beliefs 
of the government. 
Figure 4 
Chance of Position Being 
Struck Down by a Court—
Taxpayer’s View (q) 
100%/q
0% 100%
(complete certainty of 
being struck down) 
50%
1
2
Ratio of Government’s
View to Taxpayer’s 
View ( /q)
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To be clear, I am not arguing that this particular relationship is 
the actual relationship between  and q, that in fact increases faster 
than q for some range of q, or that this type of reasoning is why the 
penalties have their current structure.  I simply note that penalties 
that increase as the taxpayer’s perceived likelihood of harm increases 
are not inconsistent with marginal-deterrence theory, if we make cer-
tain assumptions—assumptions that are not impossible and perhaps 
are not even unlikely.  Thus, fault-based penalties are not necessarily 
inconsistent with, and indeed may be required by, marginal-
deterrence theory. 
More generally, when modeling tax compliance, one should take 
care to determine which probabilities are best given a subjectivist in-
terpretation and whether, if multiple probabilities occur in a model, 
these probabilities could diverge due to parties’ disparate perceptions. 
B.  The Tax Advisor as a Source of Perceived Probabilities: 
Regulatory Requirements as Debiasing Tools 
Understanding that the probability of correctness reflects the be-
liefs of individuals, and not an absolute underlying truth, provides ad-
ditional justification for detailed regulations that impose extensive re-
quirements on the substance of tax advisors’ opinions.  In particular, 
recent regulations115 and statutes116 relating to practice before the IRS 
impose strict requirements on tax advisors who provide their clients 
with certain written opinions, including opinions meant to protect the 
client from tax penalties (by, for example, showing that the client had 
the requisite level of belief in the correctness of the tax position117).  
Among other requirements, the tax advisor “must use reasonable ef-
forts” to find all relevant facts and “must not base the opinion on any 
unreasonable factual assumptions”;118 must relate the law to the facts 
and generally cannot assume the “favorable resolution of any signifi-
cant Federal tax issue”;119 and must consider (with a few exceptions) 
all significant tax issues and reach an opinion with regard to each is-
sue.120  An advisor who does not adhere to these rules may be cen-
115 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (2008). 
116 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub L. No. 108-357, §§ 812, 815, 118 Stat. 
1418, 1577-80, 1581-83 (codified as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.). 
117 See the discussion of fault-based penalties supra subsection III.A.1. 
118 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(1). 
119 Id. § 10.35(c)(2). 
120 Id. § 10.35(c)(3). 
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sured, suspended, or even disbarred.121  As discussed above,122 the 
statutory changes increase the threshold for opinions on which tax-
payers may rely and also disqualify certain advisors from rendering 
opinions that can protect taxpayers from penalties.123
The regulatory source of these rules, Circular 230,124 has been 
much criticized as tremendously burdensome and ultimately super-
fluous.125  As one scholar has noted, the rules apply to almost all for-
mal, written opinions provided by tax advisors—not just tax-shelter 
opinions—and thus “wildly overshoot the mark” intended by the 
Treasury Department—that is, the goal of reducing the number of 
opinions that protect those who use and market tax shelters.126  But 
the new regulations and statutes may serve an additional purpose, one 
not previously recognized:  these requirements not only push advisors 
to issue honest opinions, but may also actually help advisors arrive at 
less-biased estimates of the chance that a position will be upheld.  The 
requirements may make the advisors’ honest opinions less self-
interested and perhaps more accurate. 
A tax advisor who tells her client that a tax position has a particu-
lar chance of being correct is essentially an expert making a forecast:  
she is forecasting whether a court would strike down the position.127
Empirical work has shown that there are various methods for improv-
ing experts’ forecasts.  One of the best ways to improve forecasting is 
to carefully analyze past work and whether (and when) predictions 
were accurate.128  However, a serious problem faces an individual who 
is determined to improve the accuracy of her predictions of whether a 
121 Id. §§ 10.50(a), 10.60(a). 
122 See supra text accompanying notes 63-64. 
123 I.R.C. § 6664(d)(3)(B) (2006). 
124 Department of the Treasury, Circular No. 230 (rev. April 2008), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/circular_230.pdf. 
125 See, e.g., Michael L. Schler, Effects of Anti-Tax-Shelter Rules on Nonshelter Tax Prac-
tice, 109 TAX NOTES 915, 918-22 (2005) (arguing that the costs of Circular 230 exceed 
its benefits); Juan F. Vasquez, Jr. & Jaime Vasquez, Section 10.35(b)(4)(ii) of Circular 230 
Is Invalid (But Just in Case It Is Valid, Please Note that You Cannot Rely on This Article to 
Avoid the Imposition of Penalties), 7 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 293 (2007) (arguing that Cir-
cular 230 has adversely affected taxpayers). 
126 See Deborah H. Schenk, The Circular 230 Amendments:  Time to Throw Them Out 
and Start Over, 110 TAX NOTES 1311, 1312-13 (2006) (stating that Circular 230 is “over-
kill” and has “unintended negative effect[s]”). 
127 See supra Section II.B. 
128 See, e.g., Nigel Harvey, Improving Judgment in Forecasting, in PRINCIPLES OF FORE-
CASTING 59, 69-71 ( J. Scott Armstrong ed., 2001) (summarizing studies on “outcome 
and cognitive feedback”). 
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court will uphold certain tax transactions:  she will almost never find 
out whether her previous predictions were correct.129  Because few tax 
transactions are ever reviewed by a court, a tax advisor almost never 
discovers whether she had correctly predicted that a court would up-
hold the transaction.  As discussed above, the difficulty of this counter-
factual question is one reason that it seems inaccurate to interpret 
probability statements about tax positions as frequentist probabilities—
the underlying probability is not known, and therefore the prediction 
cannot be seen as a decision under risk (as opposed to uncertainty). 
Moreover, it is not clear that there is any advantage to predicting 
accurately whether a court will uphold a transaction.  The govern-
ment’s main interest is the mindset of the taxpayer:  the government 
wants taxpayers to make a good-faith effort to determine whether the 
court will uphold a transaction.  But the government also wants the 
taxpayer to make a “reasonable” judgment—that is, it wants the tax-
payer to judge and report her own chances of success in the same way 
that a non-self-interested person would judge and report those chances. 
The onerous rules regarding tax advisors’ opinions thus serve at 
least two purposes:  not only, as has been much noted, do they require 
the advisor to report her opinion honestly, but they also may serve as 
guidelines by which advisors generate less biased opinions.  More spe-
cifically, the rules may help tax advisors attend to and reduce their 
own cognitive biases.  This Section shows that the new rules require 
advisors to employ a number of crucial debiasing techniques.  But 
there may also be a limit to the potential use of these techniques.  In 
particular, some forecasting techniques rely on groups to push opin-
ions toward generally accepted beliefs and thus may be too expensive 
or too invasive of taxpayers’ privacy to be widely adopted. 
1.  Informing the Expert 
Learning as much information relevant to a judgment as possible 
helps remove bias from that judgment.  Subjective interpretations of 
probability reflect not only the view of a particular person, but also the 
information that the person has about the question to be addressed.130
129 See the discussion of the counterfactual problem supra Section II.B. 
130 This is the basic idea of Bayesianism:  begin with a prior distribution and then 
update one’s analysis as new information becomes available.  Cf. Michael Risch, How 
Can Whelan v. Jaslow and Lotus v. Borland Both Be Right?  Reexamining the Economics of 
Computer Software Reuse, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 511, 524-28 (1999) 
(arguing that a correct economic model of judicial decision making in copyright-
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Implicit in a statement like “there is a 90% chance that a court would 
uphold this transaction” (or “there is a 75% chance that the Giants 
will win on Sunday”) is the phrase “given the information that I have, I 
believe that . . . .”  Additionally, it is a key element of subjective prob-
abilities that an individual revises her probability estimate based on 
additional information that she receives about the question. 
It is especially important to learn the underlying facts when trying 
to determine whether a transaction would be upheld by a court be-
cause the transactions in question adhere to the letter of the statute; if 
they did not, it would be simple to conclude that the transactions did 
not provide the promised tax benefits.  To hold the transactions im-
permissible, courts must rely on court-created doctrines, in particular 
the economic-substance and business-purpose tests.  The economic-
substance test asks whether the transaction has nontax economic 
benefits.131  The business-purpose test asks whether the taxpayer had a 
business (i.e., nontax) purpose for entering into the transaction.132  A 
tax advisor who simply assumes that a transaction has economic sub-
stance and a business purpose could provide a strongly favorable tax 
opinion about a very dubious transaction. 
A classic example can be found in Long Term Capital Holdings v. 
United States.133  That case addressed a situation in which a law firm is-
sued a written opinion stating that the transaction in question 
“should” be upheld by a court.  The firm’s conclusion relied, however, 
on an assumption that all parties involved had a business purpose for 
the transaction and that the transaction had economic substance.  
Specifically, the firm’s opinion stated, 
You [the client] have instructed us to assume that [at all relevant times], 
each of [the parties involved] operated for valid and substantial business 
purposes with the objective of realizing a material pre-tax profit and pos-
sessed independent economic substance, and that each is expected to do 
so for the foreseeable future.
134
infringement cases takes into account the information that judges have before them at 
the time of the decision and not just information available to the parties ex ante). 
131 See, e.g., ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 2215 (1997) (“The 
doctrine of economic substance becomes applicable, and a judicial remedy is war-
ranted, where a taxpayer seeks to claim tax benefits, unintended by Congress, by 
means of transactions that serve no economic purpose other than tax savings.”), aff ’d 
in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998). 
132 See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885, 898 
(E.D. Tex. 2007). 
133 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004), aff ’d, 150 F. App’x 40 (2d Cir. 2005). 
134 Id. at 210. 
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The court held that relying on an opinion that was based on such 
broad, conclusory assumptions did not constitute reasonable, good-
faith reliance on advice of counsel and that this opinion, which in-
cluded “little, if any, of what could be characterized as legal analysis of 
the economic substance of the . . . transaction,” could not save the 
taxpayers from penalties imposed for underpayment of tax.135
To make this sort of question-begging less appealing, the law in-
cludes incentives for both taxpayers and advisors to ensure that those 
providing tax opinions have a large amount of information about the 
transaction in question.136  A taxpayer will not receive penalty protec-
tion from the advisor’s opinion if that opinion does not take into ac-
count all relevant facts, including the taxpayer’s purposes for engag-
ing in the transaction.137  This was the rule even before Long Term 
Capital Holdings and, indeed, was applied in that case.138
The recent changes to Circular 230 increase incentives for advi-
sors to obtain all the relevant information before providing taxpayers 
with tax opinions.  Under the old rules, someone providing a “tax 
shelter opinion” was required to inquire into all relevant facts and was 
not permitted to accept as true facts that she should not reasonably 
have believed to be true.139  But she was not required to verify facts in-
dependently, nor was she required to assume that a client’s statement 
of facts could not be relied upon.140  The revised rules are stricter.  
Under these rules, an advisor issuing an opinion on which a taxpayer 
can rely to avoid penalties must use “reasonable efforts” to obtain all 
relevant facts and may not base her opinion on any “unreasonable” 
factual assumptions, including “unreasonable factual representations” 
made by individuals other than the taxpayer.141  In contrast to the old 
rules, however, the new rules explicitly state that it is “unreasonable 
to assume” (rather than to establish through investigation) that a 
transaction has a business purpose or economic substance.142  These 
new requirements may help advisors provide less biased opinions. 
135 Id. at 209. 
136 See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b) (2008). 
137 Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 2003). 
138 Long Term Capital Holdings, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 210. 
139 31 C.F.R. § 10.33(a)(1)(i)–(ii) (amended 2004). 
140 Id.
141 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(1)(iii) (2008). 
142 Id. § 10.35(c)(1)(ii). 
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2.  Justifying the Conclusion 
The revised regulations also require tax opinions to describe the 
tax advisor’s reasoning behind her conclusions, including both the 
facts and legal analysis.143  This requirement of course makes it more 
difficult for a tax advisor to provide a completely spurious opinion 
that includes nothing more than her client’s desired result.  But this 
rule may also help the advisor improve the accuracy of her opinion.  
Numerous psychology and economics studies show that an expert may 
increase the reliability of her predictions if she produces analytic justi-
fications of her conclusions, as opposed to basing her opinion on her 
intuitive sense of a situation.144  Similar to the rule that an advisor 
must be fully informed before offering an opinion, the rule that an 
advisor must fully justify her conclusions may serve not only to keep 
the advisor’s conclusion honest, but also to shape that conclusion and 
help minimize the extent to which the conclusion is influenced by the 
advisor’s unconscious biases.145  Put another way, the rules may help 
“debias” the advisor’s conclusion. 
3.  Avoiding Overconfidence 
The regulation of tax opinions may also help address the problem 
that experts making forecasts are often overconfident.146  Overconfi-
dence (that is, a too-strong belief that one is correct) may particularly 
plague an advisor who is forecasting the success of a plan she has de-
veloped herself.  One way to increase the accuracy of forecasts is to 
split the tasks of developing a plan and estimating that plan’s prob-
ability of success, even if the forecaster does not intentionally misrep-
resent the chances of the success of her own plan.147  Splitting tasks 
helps to justify the statutory rule that an opinion of a tax advisor will 
not provide penalty relief for a taxpayer if the advisor is the one who 
created, promoted, or sold the transaction with regard to which her 
opinion is being sought; if her fee is contingent on the taxpayer’s re-
ceiving a promised tax benefit; or if she has a personal financial inter-
143 Id.
144 See Thomas R. Stewart, Improving Reliability of Judgmental Forecasts, in PRINCIPLES 
OF FORECASTING, supra note 128, at 81, 96-97. 
145 Id.
146 See Hal R. Arkes, Overconfidence in Judgmental Forecasting, in PRINCIPLES OF FORE-
CASTING, supra note 128, at 495, 496-98. 
147 Harvey, supra note 128, at 65-66, 74. 
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est in the transaction.148  This type of rule not only ensures a more 
neutral expert, but also may prevent a tax advisor from unintention-
ally favoring the taxpayer.  The regulations could, however, go even 
further to avoid advisor overconfidence by requiring advisors to ex-
plicitly consider arguments that go against their forecasts.149  Tax law 
does not currently require opinions to include (and presumably re-
fute) specific arguments against the advisor’s conclusion; such a re-
quirement might help the advisor reach a less biased opinion. 
4.  Group Methods:  How Much Does Accuracy Matter? 
There are a number of more powerful, group-based methods for 
increasing the accuracy of predictions, but current law does not re-
quire advisors to use these methods.  This result is probably correct, as 
cost and privacy concerns may outweigh the benefits of whatever in-
creased accuracy these methods may provide.  But if the government 
wanted to debias tax advisors’ opinions even more, it might look to 
similar group-based approaches. 
For example, one way for an expert to avoid overconfidence is to 
discuss her conclusion with a group in which someone is assigned to 
make contrary arguments.150  This technique helps the expert avoid 
defending her own beliefs too zealously, even irrationally, thus in-
creasing her confidence.151  Tax law does not, however, require this 
sort of group interaction, and it is not clear how the law could enforce 
such purely process-based requirements. 
Other group methods for improving forecasts rely on aggregat-
ing beliefs and can be used even if there is no feedback on whether 
predictions are correct.  For example, information markets—also 
known as prediction markets—appear to be one effective way of fore-
casting the future.152  Think of the stock market, in which the price of 
a stock varies based on the stock’s perceived value.  In some sense, the 
stock’s perceived value is a prediction about what will happen in the 
future, because the price of a corporation’s stock should represent the 
present value of all future cash flows stemming from owning a certain 
148 I.R.C. §§ 6664(d)(3)(B) (2006). 
149 Arkes, supra note 146, at 500-02. 
150 Id. at 502-04. 
151 Id.
152 See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 44, at 103 (citing “preliminary research” that 
shows that information markets have predictive power). 
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amount of equity in that corporation.153  Similarly, in an information 
market, parties buy and sell contracts that promise to pay a certain 
amount if a particular outcome occurs.  Like the price of a publicly 
traded stock, which increases with the stock’s perceived value, the 
price of a predicted event increases in an information market if the 
event is perceived as more likely to occur.  Information markets are a 
useful tool for predicting future events.  Information markets might 
not be a good method to determine whether a court would uphold a 
given tax transaction, however, because for the markets to work, tax-
payers would have to disclose to the public, or to a relatively large 
group, substantial information about their businesses and transactions.  
This openness might not be acceptable, especially to business taxpayers. 
The Delphi Method, used in a variety of contexts, is another 
group technique that seems to improve predictions.154  This method 
avoids the privacy concerns created by information markets.  The 
Delphi Method first asks a number of experts to fill out an anonymous 
questionnaire.  A facilitator then informs everyone in the group of the 
views of the other group members.  After hearing these views, each 
group member fills out another questionnaire.  This process is re-
peated a number of times, and at the end of the process the facilitator 
takes the group judgment to be the statistical average (either the 
mean or the median) of the experts’ views on the final question-
naire.155  The Delphi Method could be applied to estimating the prob-
ability that a court would uphold a transaction, because the question 
that the experts are asked to evaluate has a numerical answer (i.e., the 
probability number).  The Delphi Method might be unattractive to 
clients, however, because the method requires a number of experts 
153 See, e.g., ANDREW BAUM & DAVID MACKMIN, THE INCOME APPROACH TO PROP-
ERTY VALUATION 53 (3d ed. 1989) (“Valuation [can be] summarised as the estimation 
of the future benefits to be enjoyed from the ownership of a freehold or a leasehold 
interest in land or property, expressing those future benefits in terms of present 
worth.”); ALFRED M. KING, VALUATION 91 (2002) (“In the final analysis, an investment 
in any asset is worth no more than the present value today of the income to be derived 
in the future from that investment.”).  To take into account the fact that future cash 
flows are not guaranteed, the discount rate may be adjusted for future cash flows.  Al-
ternately, one could lay out multiple risk-free scenarios and then weight each scenario by 
one’s estimated probability of that scenario’s occurring. See KING, supra, at 95-100. 
154 See, e.g., Kesten C. Green et al., Methods to Elicit Forecasts from Groups:  Delphi and 
Prediction Markets Compared, FORESIGHT, Fall 2007, at 17 (collecting sources stating that 
the Delphi technique improves decision making when compared to techniques used in 
traditional group meetings). 
155 Gene Rowe & George Wright, Expert Opinions in Forecasting: The Role of the Delphi 
Technique, in PRINCIPLES OF FORECASTING, supra note 128, at 125, 126-27. 
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(at least five, and perhaps as many as twenty).156  If taxpayers were 
billed by the hour for each expert, and if the per capita time spent was 
not significantly less than the usual approach of having only one or 
two attorneys work on a tax opinion, taxpayers might bridle at the 
Delphi Method’s cost. 
*      *      * 
In short, interpreting probability statements as statements of be-
lief, instead of statements reflecting some objective external reality, 
highlights a previously acknowledged benefit of the current law regu-
lating tax advisors:  this law, although onerous, may serve not only to 
keep tax advisors honest, but also to debias advisors’ opinions.  
Stronger, group-based debiasing tools are available but are probably 
impossible to implement due to cost and privacy concerns, thus lend-
ing additional support to the current requirements that the regula-
tions impose on tax advisors’ opinions.  This discussion does not, of 
course, necessarily mean that the law regulating tax opinions should 
stand as currently written.  But when discussing whether, and how, to 
amend Circular 230 and other guidances affecting tax advisors, the 
benefits of debiasing should be taken into account. 
C.  Uncertainty Aversion:  When Not Knowing Is the Penalty 
It might seem that to describe uncertainty in tax law is to diagnose 
a problem.  Perhaps we should work to minimize this ambiguity; 
should not law be as certain as possible?  But empirical work suggests 
that we should be careful before reducing tax law’s uncertainty.  As 
discussed above, law and economics proposes that an individual takes 
an action when the benefit of that action to her outweighs its cost.  
One cost suggested by a subjectivist approach to tax probabilities is 
the cost of uncertainty itself.  Some taxpayers may be averse to uncer-
tainty—as opposed to risk—and therefore increasing tax law’s cer-
tainty might actually, all else being equal, increase the number of 
questionable or forbidden transactions.  This Section describes uncer-
tainty aversion and explains how uncertainty aversion could operate to 
reduce the number of questionable transactions into which taxpayers 
enter.  Whether taxpayers are in fact averse to uncertainty is, of 
course, an empirical question, but it is a question that should be taken 
156 Id. at 128-29. 
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into account when using a welfarist approach to model optimal tax 
penalties. 
1.  Uncertainty Aversion Defined 
Daniel Ellsberg famously presented the following thought ex-
periment:  imagine two urns, each containing some combination of 
red and black balls.157  You know that the first urn contains one hun-
dred red and black balls, but in some unknown ratio—there may be 
zero red balls, or there may be one hundred.  You know that the sec-
ond urn contains fifty red balls and fifty black balls.  You may choose 
either to bet $100 that a red ball will be drawn from the first urn or to 
bet $100 that a red ball will be drawn from the second urn.  If you 
choose to bet on the second urn, you have chosen risk (a known 
probability) over uncertainty (an unknown probability) because you 
know the odds that a red ball will be drawn from the second urn, but 
you do not know the odds that a red ball will be drawn from the first 
urn.158  A person who prefers to avoid uncertainty (unknown prob-
abilities) is said to be “uncertainty averse” or “ambiguity averse.”159  A 
large amount of empirical data shows that many individuals are in fact 
uncertainty averse.160
157 Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. ECON. 643, 650 
(1961).
158 Interestingly, if you would also prefer to bet $100 that a black ball will be drawn 
from the second urn, rather than betting $100 that a black ball will be drawn from the 
first urn, you apparently (if we do not take the risk/uncertainty distinction into ac-
count) think both that drawing a red ball from the second urn is more likely than 
drawing a red ball from the first urn, and also that drawing a black ball from the sec-
ond urn is more likely than drawing a black ball from the first urn.  But this means that 
you regard drawing a red ball from the second urn as more probable than drawing a 
red ball from the first urn, and you also regard drawing a not-red ball from the second 
urn as more probable than drawing a not-red ball from the first urn.  As Ellsberg 
shows, this is inconsistent with “essential properties of probability relationships.”  Id. at 
651-63.  Specifically, it violates two axioms proposed by Leonard Savage:  (1) there 
must be complete ordering of actions—that is, as between two actions, either Action I 
is preferred to Action II, Action II is preferred to Action I, or there is indifference be-
tween Action I and Action II, and that transitivity applies to this ordering (complete 
ordering of actions); and (2) if Action I and Action II have the same pay-off for a given 
event, the choice between these two actions should not be affected by this event (the 
“Sure Thing” principle).  Id.
159 Several formal definitions of ambiguity aversion have been suggested.  See, e.g.,
Larry G. Epstein, A Definition of Uncertainty Aversion, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 579, 583-86 
(1999); David Schmeidler, Subjective Probability and Expected Utility Without Additivity, 57 
ECONOMETRICA 571, 578-84 (1989). 
160 See, e.g., Jeff T. Casey & John T. Scholz, Boundary Effects of Vague Risk Information 
on Taxpayer Decisions, 50 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 360 
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2.  Uncertainty Aversion and Probability of Audit 
A number of scholars have noted that tax compliance may benefit 
from uncertainty aversion, but this work has generally focused on the 
uncertainty of audit—that is, the uncertainty that a forbidden position 
will be discovered by the tax authorities—and not on the uncertainty 
of the law itself.  To provide an example of uncertainty aversion, this 
subsection describes, first, why taxpayers are uncertain about whether 
they will be audited and, second, previous scholarly work describing 
how this aversion to uncertainty can be used to increase compliance. 
The probability that a penalty will be imposed can be decomposed 
into two probabilities:  the probability of detection and the probability 
that the position taken is a position that is incorrect—that is, a posi-
tion that would be subject to a penalty if detected. 
Formally, we can return to Equation 1161:
U(I - T ) > p × U(I – T – F ) + (1 – p) × U(I – t).
The probability that a taxpayer will have to pay a penalty for tak-
ing a tax position, p, can be decomposed into (at least) two probabili-
ties:  the probability of detection, p( find), and the probability that the 
position taken is incorrect, p(incorrect).  We can easily relate these two 
probabilities.  The chance, p, that the position is both incorrect and 
detected can be rewritten as 
p = p( find & incorrect) = p( find | incorrect) × p(incorrect), 
where p( find | incorrect) is the probability that a position is detected 
(found), given that it is incorrect. 
As we have already seen, a statement regarding the chance that a 
position is incorrect, p(incorrect), is best interpreted as a statement 
about belief.  As a number of scholars have noted, p( find), the prob-
ability of detection, should also be interpreted as a statement about 
belief.162  Indeed, we might decompose p( find) further, into the 
chance of audit and the chance that, given that the taxpayer is au-
dited, the position is detected.  It seems clear that the probability of 
detection, given audit, is a counterfactual and as such is “hard[] to es-
(1991); Dipankar Ghosh & Terry L. Crain, Structure of Uncertainty and Decision Making:  
An Experimental Investigation, 24 DECISION SCI. 789 (1993); Anat Horovitz & Uzi Segal, 
The Ambiguous Nature of Ambiguity and Crime Control, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 541, 542, 
548 n.19 (2007); see also infra text accompanying notes 173-175. 
161 See supra Section I.A. 
162 See, e.g., Raskolnikov, supra note 4, at 584-85. 
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timate.”163  Contrary to the claims of at least one legal scholar,164
though, the probability of audit is also difficult, perhaps impossible, 
for a taxpayer to know accurately. 
The problem here is somewhat different than the problem pre-
sented by the compliance continuum.  There, it was impossible to 
know the probability that a position would be upheld on review by a 
court.  In contrast, the probability of audit is knowable—or, at least, 
more knowable.  We might say that on a spectrum of subjective to ob-
jective probabilities, the probability of being audited is far toward the 
objective end.  However, although the probability of audit is know-
able, taxpayers do not actually know that probability:  the IRS makes 
sure that the details of its methods for selecting taxpayers for audit are 
secret.  Thus, from a taxpayer’s perspective, the probability of being 
audited is best interpreted subjectively. 
The example of how individuals (as opposed to corporations) are 
selected for audit helps clarify why a subjective interpretation is the 
best interpretation of statements about the probability of audit in the 
deterrence context.  Individuals may be selected for audit in one of 
three ways.165  The first way, random selection, is so uncommon as to 
verge on irrelevance for deterrence purposes:  under the current sys-
tem, about 13,000 returns annually—out of over 130,000,000—are se-
lected for audit at random.166  The chances of being selected for ran-
dom audit are thus about 0.01%.  The other two ways are more 
interesting for our purposes.  Individuals may be selected through IRS 
special projects, in which the IRS decides that it will focus on returns 
with particular characteristics.  These projects vary from year to year.  
They are sometimes, but not always, announced publicly before the 
projects begin.  Finally, individuals may be selected for audit through 
statistical profiling.  The IRS scores individual returns using its Dis-
criminant Index Function (DIF).  Any return that scores above a cer-
tain numerical threshold is reviewed “by hand”—that is, by an indi-
vidual human auditor who decides, based on her review of the return, 
163 Id. at 584. 
164 See id. (claiming that the audit rate is “well known and well documented” and 
that the portion of the detection probability that involves the probability of audit is 
thus not problematic). 
165 See Sarah B. Lawsky, Fairly Random:  On Compensating Audited Taxpayers, 41 
CONN. L. REV. 163, 166-70 (2008). 
166 Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv. Media Relations Office, IRS Updates Na-
tional Research Program for Individuals ( June 6, 2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-news/ir-07-113.pdf. 
2009] Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertainty 1069
whether the taxpayer will be audited.  The DIF is determined based 
on statistical analyses of information gathered through the random 
audits.  The key for our purposes is that the DIF is secret, as is the cut-
off score.  No taxpayer knows how to determine her DIF score ex ante. 
One could theoretically assemble a useful frequentist analysis of 
the chance that an individual has of being selected for audit, but the 
problem here is the problem of determining the relevant reference 
class.  For example, say the IRS audits 10% of all tax returns that it re-
ceives each year.  It would be wrong to conclude, based on this num-
ber, that a given very large corporation has a 10% chance of being 
audited in a given year if 100% of very large corporations are audited 
every year.  In other words, information about the reference class of 
all tax return filers does not provide much information about the 
chances that a very large corporation will be audited. 
Similarly, although the IRS audits about 1% of individual tax re-
turns it receives each year,167 it is not necessarily the case that a given 
individual has a 1% chance of being audited.  Again, this is a refer-
ence-class issue.  The IRS does not select 1% of individual tax returns 
at random; rather, the IRS uses special projects and DIF scores to se-
lect subgroups of individuals on which it will focus its audit efforts.  
For example, if the IRS notices that individuals in Georgia tend to 
underpay their federal income taxes, it may focus its audit resources 
on residents of Georgia.  It may then choose the particular residents 
to audit at random.  Thus, within the reference class of residents of 
Georgia, an individual may have a 10% chance of being selected for 
audit.  If a Georgia resident believed that she had a 1% chance of be-
ing selected for audit, she would be woefully underestimating her ac-
tual chances of audit.  But the IRS does not always announce special 
projects in advance of their implementation, and it may have different 
special projects from year to year—it may focus on auditing Georgia 
residents for one year only, or it may extend the project over many 
years.  Simply put, an individual will not know in advance of filing her 
return whether she will end up as part of a special project.  Her error 
might, however, be in either direction; she might incorrectly believe 
either that she will be part of a special project or that she will be part 
of the general pool of tax returns, not subject to a special project. 
Or take the class of individuals who file tax returns with DIF scores 
in excess of the cutoff score.  Individuals whose returns have DIF 
scores that exceed the cutoff score apparently have a much higher 
167 Id. at 189. 
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chance of being audited than do individuals whose returns have low 
DIF scores (and who are not part of a group that is the subject of a 
special project).  But the IRS intentionally keeps the DIF and cutoff 
score secret, so an individual cannot determine before she submits 
her return whether she will have a DIF score high enough to subject 
her to an increased chance of audit.  It is generally believed that cer-
tain positions on a tax return are red flags that automatically trigger 
audits.  It may be, though, that these positions do not trigger audits 
but rather increase these particular individuals’ DIF scores enough to 
trigger an audit. 
The IRS may also use other techniques to select tax returns for 
audit.  Fraudulent tax-return data can sometimes be detected simply 
by examining the digits on the tax return, a technique known as digi-
tal analysis.  For example, digits in actual financial numbers do not 
appear randomly.  The first digits of actual financial numbers tend to 
be lower rather than higher—“1” will appear more frequently than 
“2”; “2” will appear more frequently than “3”; and so forth.  Fraudu-
lent tax return data generally does not follow this rule.168  It is known 
that some state tax authorities use digital analysis to detect fraudulent 
returns, but the IRS will not reveal whether it uses the technique.169
Although taxpayers do not know their chances of being audited, 
they could obtain a better sense of that probability.  An individual 
taxpayer could know her chances of being selected for a random au-
dit, but as discussed above, the chance of being selected for a random 
audit is only about 0.01% and as such is not terribly useful for deter-
rence.  It is probably not possible to predict special IRS projects.  In 
theory, though, taxpayers could figure out a fairly good approxima-
tion of the Discriminant Index Function by pooling years of their tax 
return information and audits and running a regression analysis to 
figure out how the IRS was selecting returns to audit—that is, what 
items on a tax return increased chances of an audit, in what combina-
tion, and by how much.  TurboTax actually has a smaller, and thus 
much less effective, version of this project:  after an individual fills out 
her tax return using TurboTax, but before she files, TurboTax tells 
her whether she is at high risk of audit, based on the deductions she 
has taken as compared to deductions taken by others,170 and “provides 
168 See James Tackett et al., Profiling Fictitious Tax Data, 116 TAX NOTES 953, 955
(2007) (discussing this rule, known as “Benford’s Law”).
169 Id.
170 See Sandra Block, Software Can Save When Filing Your Taxes, USA TODAY, Feb. 29, 
2008, at 3B. 
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suggestions for reducing [her] audit risk.”171  Similarly, some people 
believe that certain deductions (such as the home-office deduction) 
are red flags that will trigger an audit,172 and so they may avoid these 
deductions in order to hide other, more lucrative, and perhaps unlaw-
ful tax avoidance. 
Regardless of the precise techniques that the IRS uses or does not 
use, the result of its secrecy about those techniques is that taxpayers 
do not know with certainty whether they will end up in a group with a 
high audit rate or in a group with a low audit rate.  While they know, 
or could know, that the content of their return may itself increase 
their chances of audit, they do not know how the content of the re-
turn has that effect, and so they are unable to control the precise con-
tent of their return in order to minimize their chances of audit. 
In the real world, then, a taxpayer does not know the chance that 
she will be audited, either because of the factors described above or 
perhaps because she has not investigated her chances of audit.  A 
number of empirical studies have found that this uncertainty about 
one’s audit rate may increase tax compliance.  For example, one study 
asked its subjects to fill out a model tax return and then to estimate 
their probability of audit.  The subjects were permitted either to give a 
single number or to give a range around a mean; all the subjects 
chose the latter.  The study found that taxpayers tended to comply 
less, the smaller the range they provided—that is, there was less com-
pliance when there was less (perceived) ambiguity associated with the 
audit rate.173
It does not appear, however, that increasing audit uncertainty nec-
essarily increases compliance.  The same study that found that compli-
ance increased with uncertainty also found that increased uncertainty 
had less of an effect when taxpayers perceived an overall lower chance 
of audit.174  Another study found that “[w]hen individuals receive 
nothing for their tax payments, [audit] uncertainty increases compli-
ance[, but] when individuals perceive that they receive a public 
171 John Rizzo, Intuit TurboTax and H&R Block TaxCut, MACWORLD, Mar. 4, 2008, 
http://www.macworld.com/article/132338/2008/03/taxprep_desktop.html?t=203. 
172 See, e.g., Harvey, supra note 128. 
173 See Ghosh & Crain, supra note 160, at 800 (“These results support the predic-
tions that the lower the mean and lesser the ambiguity of the probability distribution, 
the higher the intentional noncompliance.”); cf. Tom Baker et al., The Virtues of Uncer-
tainty in Law:  An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443, 446-47(2004) (showing 
via experiment in a nontax context “that uncertainty with regard to either the size of 
the sanction or the probability of detection increases deterrence”). 
174 Ghosh & Crain, supra note 160, at 800. 
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good . . . , uncertainty always lowers compliance.”175  In short, uncer-
tainty about the audit rate has some effect on compliance, but that ef-
fect depends on a variety of other factors and thus its direction may be 
difficult to predict. 
3.  Extending Uncertainty Aversion:  Uncertainty 
Aversion and Ambiguous Law 
The probability of audit is, as discussed above, not the only source 
of uncertainty for taxpayers who are trying to determine whether to 
comply with the law:  tax law itself is a source of uncertainty.176  It 
might initially seem that this uncertainty should be reduced.  But, as 
the empirical work on audit uncertainty suggests, and as this subsec-
tion argues, reformers should consider whether uncertainty itself has 
benefits and, in particular, whether uncertainty aversion operates to 
increase compliance. 
Some uncertainty about tax law is unavoidable as long as the cor-
rectness of a tax position depends on predicting the future actions of 
a court.  But this uncertainty could be reduced.  For example, as ex-
plained above,177 one good way to improve forecasts (which would in 
turn reduce uncertainty) is to look at the success of prior forecasts.  
But few tax transactions are reviewed by courts, and thus little data is 
available to check prior forecasts.  If the government were determined 
to reduce uncertainty in tax law, it could decide to dedicate a large 
amount of resources to bringing tax disputes to court, so that both 
taxpayers and the government had more information about how 
courts actually addressed the questionable issues.  Some uncertainty 
would, however, remain. 
Other uncertainty might be reduced even if the government de-
cided not to pursue an aggressive litigation strategy.  For example, not 
all taxpayers are sophisticated, and not all taxpayers can hire lawyers 
to provide them with tax advice.  Educating taxpayers or simplifying 
the law could reduce taxpayers’ uncertainty to the extent that their 
uncertainty is due to ignorance or confusion. 
There may be good reason to educate taxpayers, to simplify the 
law, or to take other steps to reduce legal uncertainty.  But reducing 
uncertainty may also end up reducing compliance.  For example, one 
175 James Alm et al., Institutional Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance, 82 AM. ECON.
REV. 1018, 1024-25 (1992). 
176 See supra Part II. 
177 See supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text. 
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argument against the (eventually adopted) “check the box” regime, 
which permits certain entities to elect their classification for tax pur-
poses, was that the nonelective regime’s uncertainty increased “costs 
and risks” associated with potentially abusive techniques and thus re-
duced the use of these techniques.178
More generally, one study examined how subjects reacted to in-
creased vagueness about whether a tax deduction would be disal-
lowed.179  The subjects were given a probability that the deduction 
would be disallowed, qualified either by a statement from an account-
ant that “I am very unsure and hesitate to guess” about the probability 
that the deduction would be disallowed or that the probability was 
“exact.”180  The study found that people tended to be more uncer-
tainty averse when risks were low.  The authors, a psychologist and a 
political scientist, thus suggested that to increase compliance when 
risks are low, the government should actually decrease the precision 
of information available.181  As legal scholars and tax compliance ex-
perts consider simplifying the law, or modifying the definition of cor-
rectness to decrease uncertainty, they should take into account that 
uncertainty is not necessarily, from a compliance perspective, a nega-
tive characteristic. 
Additionally, theoretical models of tax compliance may benefit 
from taking into account an additional aspect of deterrence:  the 
built-in penalty that is uncertainty.  It has long been acknowledged 
that a simple model that considers only the utility of the money in-
volved in cheating or not cheating on taxes does not explain tax com-
pliance, because the audit rate is so low.182  Experimental results sug-
gest that an aversion to uncertainty is one factor among many that 
may also increase compliance and thus one factor that should be con-
sidered when modeling optimal tax penalties. 
178 See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEFERRAL OF INCOME 
EARNED THROUGH U.S. CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 69 (2000), quoted in
Adam H. Rosenzweig, Harnessing the Costs of International Tax Arbitrage, 26 VA. TAX REV.
555, 580 n.46 (2007); see also Rosenzweig, supra, at 627 & n.142. 
179 Casey & Scholz, supra note 160, at 362. 
180 Id. at 371. 
181 Id. at 387. 
182 See, e.g., Lawsky, supra note 165, at 189 n.118 (collecting sources supporting this 
proposition). 
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CONCLUSION
This Article examined a concept that underlies many economic 
analyses of tax compliance:  the meaning of the probability that a tax 
position will be subject to sanction.  This sort of probability statement 
is best interpreted as a statement about belief, because whether a tax 
position is correct is a decision under uncertainty.  The Article de-
scribed three implications of this subjectivist approach to interpreting 
tax probability statements.  First, a subjectivist interpretation of tax 
probability statements shows that, contrary to accepted views, fault-
based penalties are not necessarily inconsistent with, and in fact may 
be required by, a welfarist approach to tax compliance.  Second, sub-
jectivism may provide additional support for strict and much-criticized 
requirements that current law imposes on tax opinions provided by 
legal advisors.  And, finally, a subjectivist approach highlights an addi-
tional area of ambiguity in tax law, which, given that some individuals 
are averse to uncertainty, may warn against making laws more certain. 
More generally, economic methods and models can be useful and 
powerful tools for creating and analyzing tax policy.  But, as the ex-
ample of probability suggests, we must be careful not to let the use of 
mathematics in articulating these models seduce us into believing that 
the answers provided by this sort of reasoning are right in some abso-
lute sense.  Indeed, one important use of an economic approach to 
law is to highlight areas about which we are uncertain, and thus to 
create not definitive answers, but rather new questions. 
